

Marine Corps Gazette

JANUARY 1955

THIRTY CENTS



Marine Corps Gazette

JANUARY 1955

NUMBER 1


VOLUME 39

PROFESSIONAL MAGAZINE FOR UNITED STATES MARINES

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COVER



The blast of the Bomb and its tremendous potential made our amphibious planners take time out for another look at the "book." Those of you who are pondering, and who are planning ways and means of circumventing the effect the Bomb might have on present tactical and logistical amphibious concepts, might do well to pause a moment and take a look at *Who Said Impossible?* (page 10). It's possible that its thesis might add grist to run through the mill of your tactical thinking. On the other hand, continued Communist activities in the Far East, to which much of this issue is devoted, present a different problem.

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
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message center

NCO Leadership

... LtCol Heinl's article on NCO leadership is reminiscent but controversial. I do not believe that specialization has cost the Marine Corps its Staff NCO leadership. Every man can be respected if he knows his job—and respect is what makes a leader. I believe the fault lies in two changes in the Marine Corps: present T/Os and officer professional ability. First, T/Os now include an officer in charge and an assistant officer in charge in a section where a few years ago a master sergeant efficiently handled things. Secondly, are officers themselves leaders and do they want the NCOs to lead? My experiences say the officers don't; officers are jealous of their own positions, or lack of positions. Col Heinl questions the ratio of privates to other enlisted personnel; he wants more privates. It would be more practical to question the increase in ratio of officers to enlisted and of the effect it has had on the leadership possibilities (not qualities), of staff NCOs. An NCO cannot reflect leadership qualities if he is discouraged from displaying initiative, if he does not have the backing of the right type of officer and if he is pushed into menial chores instead of performing duties for which he is trained and for which he is qualified through years of experience. The status of NCOs must be raised, but it cannot be done in post-graduate courses at Quantico nor by turning backward to the recruitment of broken-English gunnery sergeants from foreign nations. We have to make room for leaders by removing the officers who have taken over NCO duties since 1950.

GEORGE E. BURLAGE
MSGT, USMC

Philadelphia, Penna.

... LtCol Heinl's November article *NCOs—A Challenge From Within*, will certainly raise the eyebrows and blood pressure of many enlisted Ma-

rines, career or otherwise. He has protracted from the present, a situation which cannot be compared to that of yesteryear under any circumstances. The Colonel has opened the issue very wide and now the challenge will come from within.

Since this is going to be a debatable article, I for one would like to see just a few of the many rebuttals offered the Colonel and would like to suggest that a few pages of a future GAZETTE issue be made available for this purpose.

ROBERT A. LANG
SSgt, USMC

Philadelphia, Pa.

... Of particular merit was LtCol R. D. Heinl's article analyzing our present difficulties with the corps of NCOs. However, neither in the Colonel's article, nor in any other, did I see any suggested solution for a problem peculiar to our noncommissioned officer ranks which plagues officer and enlisted alike and is one of the chief causes of lowered efficiency among rated personnel. I refer to the problem of the inefficient NCO who can't or won't perform his duties properly. Every unit in the Marine Corps has them, dragging down the outfit as a whole, inspiring contempt for NCOs among the privates and PFCs, coasting along from payday to payday until the opportunity presents itself to the CO to shanghai them to some other unit where the whole sad business is repeated.

The Basic School solution is "leadership." "Just apply leadership, proper supervision, etc., and in due time Corporal Bonehead will be on his way to a Sergeant's stripes if not to the Basic School itself—" so say the poobahs of MCS. However, as any experienced officer or NCO knows, some people just haven't got it and never will have it. Permitting them to wear more stripes than they can handle works an injustice against the Marine Corps, the man's subor-

dinates, his contemporaries who must support him and his seniors.

Well, what to do with them? The "democratic" solution currently in vogue is to bring them up before some kind of board which invariably decides that Bonehead has not been exposed to sufficient leadership and recommends transfer to another outfit, without reduction. A trifle unsatisfactory to say the least.

How about this, then: Why not authorize company commanders to reduce sergeants and corporals administratively for inefficiency? A method that would be quick, quiet and efficient. There are many who will complain that this is giving too much power to company graders. But most company grade officers in the Marine Corps know what they are doing and can be counted on to wield this authority judiciously.

Inefficient Staff NCOs? There are a few floating around. (Not many, thank heaven!) Since Headquarters makes them, Headquarters, upon receipt of a letter from a battalion commander or higher, accompanied by a statement to the effect that SSgt so-and-so doesn't know from beans should, if it feels the action is justified, reduce the inefficient Staff NCO.

JOHN L. LOWE
Capt, USMC


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Retrospect

... To the contributors to the November issue, my thanks—and complete agreement except for a few points enumerated below.

1. I cannot submit to the statement in "Message Center" under the caption "Reflections" which reads "No Staff NCO has the right to demand respect, etc." I think, on the contrary, that demanding respect is an inherent right of authority—more so, it is a duty. The word "win" as applied to gaining respect is defined in my mind in two ways. On one hand, it suggests a contest with subordinates for which there is neither time nor logical necessity; on the other, it could mean that an NCO should *persuade* his subordinates to respect him. It is my belief that in 99 per cent of the men who join the Marine Corps there is a ready-made recognition of the rightness of subordination to legal au-

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
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thority. In these cases neither demand nor persuasion is necessary. The leader need only *preserve* their respect by his conduct and ability. The one per cent who will not conform, at least to the extent of displaying the outward signs of respectful conduct, should be given an ultimatum (after due attention to background and possible personal problems) or, if they do not then respond, be turned over to the disciplinary processes of the Naval Service which are nothing more than a formal "demand" for respect.

In our desire to attain the ideal of a Marine NCO who possesses physical, moral and mental attributes which guarantee high esteem by subordinates, we should not forget that we have the right to expect our privates to have a mature knowledge of their relative position in life—a knowledge which they should acquire as a child, not as a man.

2. In the pro and con discussion of the new-old drill on pages 22-23, both sides touch upon the improvement of NCO leadership. This writer must lean toward the pro side of the debate due to his sympathy with the principal of re-

capturing the stature of the Marines' forgotten man, the corporal. The rank of corporal is the foundation of our NCO structure and while emphasizing the improvement of our senior NCOs we must also dedicate much of our attention to the corporal who is the raw material of future senior NCOs. Additional responsibility and opportunity to command which is now being provided the corporal must not end with the drill period. He should be given a group of men on as permanent a basis as possible over whom he may exercise authority far beyond the limits of the drill field. Remember, the squad leader of the old days not only loved and heckled his people maternally through all phases of housekeeping and table manners, but also let the aura of his paternal personality extend to include liberty conduct as a reflection of his ability.

3. The article *A Look at Our Awards*: I would like to add the following suggestion. Continue to award stars as heretofore to support units, but have all *services* adopt a device which may be worn by personnel who have actually taken part in tactical offensive action against

an enemy while members of forward units. Perhaps a gold lightning bolt might fill the requirements.

4. I thoroughly enjoyed *NCOs—A Challenge from Within*, but my feathers ruffled at the paragraph on page 48 which cites the job monopoly in the billets of first sergeant and sergeant major by "administrative brahmins." Since there is no qualification to this phrase in the article, I assume that this paragraph was directed at the 0149s of the Corps.

Among the older men, especially sergeants major, who fall in this unfortunate category, there are many who have become worn and physically damaged by both age and the nature of their tasks.

Those 0149s who, because of their long time in grade, are becoming increasingly "disqualified" for the top positions in enlisted billets may experience the shock of relegation to the status of clerks in the future and I am sure that they will accept it with good military stoicism. But please, spare them ironical allusions to the influence that they possess by dint of having done a job which no one else would accept.

T. J. MINAHAN
MSgt, USMC

Camp Lejeune, NC

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How Now?

...Congratulations to Major Tobin on his "sure to be controversial" *Morale*. But before many people sound off regarding his article may I take an objective viewpoint and quote from *Crusade In Europe* which was written by one who needs no by-line.

"Diffidence or modesty must never blind the commander to his duty of showing himself to his men, of speaking to them, of mingling with them to the extent of physical limitations. It pays big dividends in terms of morale and morale, given rough equality in other things, is supreme on the battlefield."

What sayest thou now, Major Tobin?

D. J. REGAN
LtCol, USMC

Quantico, Va.

... Re *Morale*. I also feel we should not accept the concept of a so-called "democratic" armed service. Only the "military mind" can successfully conduct military opera-

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
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tions, just as only the "business mind" can successfully operate business ventures. Without discipline there is danger that our "democratic" armed service will, in the face of the enemy, be like the man who put on his hat and went off in six directions at once. Any armed service should exist for its ability and will to fight. Training without subjection to the accompanying regimen and discipline will not build this ability or will. Fortunately, most Marine Corps recruits are motivated by a strong sense of duty to country and/or a desire to be Marines. The national solution lies in home and school. Even GySgt Dan Daly couldn't lead an undisciplined force. The spirit (esprit de corps) such men possessed becomes increasingly rare today. Our nation has not yet felt the full impact of its passing. Let's not succumb to a tendency to relax Marine Corps standards and discipline solely in the light of non-professional opinion.

WINFIELD S. TUBBS
TSgt, USMC

Colorado Springs, Colorado

Awards

... Congratulations to LtCol Battered for writing the much needed article on *A Look At Our Awards*, in the November issue.

O. F. PEATROSS
LtCol, USMC

Washington, DC

... The author of the excellent article, *A Look at Our Awards*, might be interested to learn that at least one individual ignored — initially — the award of a decoration for distinguished conduct in the field. Fanny, an accomplished gunner and something of a character, was commanding a battery at the outset of the Somme battle in 1916. For his part in the opening phase he was given the immediate award of the Distinguished Service Order. The award having appeared in orders everyone looked for Fanny to mount the red-blue-red ribbon at the head of the modest herbaceous border already adorning his left breast. But nothing happened and eventually the general ventured the comment, "Fanny, I see you're not wearing your DSO ribbon." "No Sir," Fanny grunted; "I don't think I've earned it yet." For the nonce the divisional commander — a man of infinite wisdom and understanding — let it go at that. Then came the climactic September battles with Fanny's battery in the thick of it throughout. With the division about to pull out of the line, the general again paid a call on Fanny and early in the proceedings observed and commented on the fact that the gunner was now sporting his DSO. Fanny's gruff explanation was, "Well, I think I've earned it now."

REGINALD HARGREAVES
Major, Ret.

Hants, England

Dan Daly

... Recently while perusing a history of World War I, I came across a report by the then SecNav, Josephus Daniels, which covered the action of the Marine Corps in that war. The report is replete with passages extolling the heroism, courage and unconquerable fighting spirit of the US Marines of that era and contains the following tribute to the indomitable Dan Daly: "Let one, therefore, stand for the many, one

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name denote all, one act of heroism tell the story of the countless deeds of bravery that stand forth brilliantly upon the victorious pages of America's participation in this the world's greatest war: 1st Sergeant Daniel Daly, 83d (Machine gun) Company, twice holder of the Medal of Honor, repeatedly performed deeds of valor of great service. On June 5 he extinguished, at great risk of his life, fire in the ammunition dump at Lucy-le-Bocage. On June 7, while his sector was under heavy bombardment, he visited all gun crews of his company, then posted over a wide section of front, cheering the men. On June 10, single-handed, he attacked an enemy machine gun emplacement and captured it by use of hand grenades and his automatic pistol. On the same date during enemy attack on Bouresches, he brought in wounded under fire. At all times by his reckless daring, constant attention to the wants of his men, and his unquestionable optimism, he was a tower of strength until wounded by the enemy shrapnel fire on June 20. A peerless soldier of the old school, twice decorated for gallantry in China and Santo Domingo." The above citation is not only an interesting postscript to the Dan Daly story, but contains the compliment all professional soldiers hope to some day be worthy of—"A peerless soldier of the old school."

G. J. DECARO
MSgt, USMC

Carlsbad, California

Count Me In!

...I would like to take a paragraph or so to commend the forwardness of MSgt Burdette W. Odekirk, Sr., on his letter titled *Reflections*.... It was, in my opinion, one of the best to be printed.

Military neatness has been sliding away in the past few years and it's time that a few more people made an effort to correct it.

When a man is indoctrinated into military life as a Marine he is taught the correct way to wear his uniform. It is up to us, as staff noncommissioned officers and also as noncommissioned officers, to spark this young Marine in his military life ahead.

I, for one, am willing to take up

the "Gung Ho" cry of Sergeant Odekirk and work myself into an example.

Well done, Sergeant!

JOHN H. THORNE
SSgt, USMC

Sacramento, Calif.

Previous Service

...Having read the articles *Pro* and *Con* and *Our Authors* column, which appeared in the November issue of the GAZETTE, I'm confused.

MSgt Evans wrote in the fourth paragraph of his article, that "The Old Drill was at its peak when I came into service in 1937." However, in your *Our Authors* column about MSgt Evans and TSgt Kelly you printed, "MSgt Evans entered the Corps in 1941, just seven months before Kelly."


Did MSgt Evans first serve in some branch of service other than the Corps, or did somebody goof?

JOHN K. BAIRD
Sgt. USMC

New York, N. Y.

ED: *He served with the Army before he came into the Marine Corps.*

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☛ **Major Anthony Crockett**, Royal Marines, in his eighteenth year of military service, has served both ashore and afloat throughout the world. As a result of his recent tour of duty in Malaya with the RM commando units he has compiled his experiences into a book dealing with his unit, 3 Commando Brigade. In his story *Green Beret, Red Star* which was recently published in England, he covers both the humorous and serious side of the Royal Marines in Malaya. His article for the *GAZETTE Action in Malaya* (page 28) deals more with the professional aspect of fighting the communist terrorists.



MAJ CROCKETT

Prior to his Malayan duty, Major Crockett had the distinction of commanding the Royal Marines' Guard of Honor outside Westminster Abbey for the present Queen's Coronation. Now back in England after 3 years in Malaya he is presently serving with GSO II (training) at Amphibious Headquarters, London.

☛ Not too long ago, in a discussion about tanks, a Basic School student happened to comment on the Russian T-34. The tank instructor, an unnamed Captain, asked the Lieutenant where he'd heard about the Russian tank. "In the *GAZETTE* — an article by **Garrett Underhill**," replied the Lieutenant. "Underhill, who's he? Never heard of him," came back the Captain.

Actually Mr Underhill is recognized as an authority on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, as you will see when you read *Red Armor—Turretless Tanks* (page 18). As a consultant and writer for *Life* magazine he has been interested in Russian armor and military organization since the Soviet Union's first foreign performance in Spain in 1937. He has written articles for many na-

tional magazines and technical journals on the subject.

During WW II Mr Underhill served as Chief Editor for all the Military Intelligence Service publications. Recalled to active duty at the outbreak of the Korean conflict, he was connected with the Army General Staff, G-2 as a specialist on the Soviet Army and also manager of the Army Handbook program on Foreign Armies. Is there still a question, Captain?

☛ A fetish of all aviators is incarnated by **Maj Robert F. Steinkraus** in *Rotate the Squadron* (page 24). Major Steinkraus, a veteran of 12 years in Marine Aviation has been studying the subject of personnel and training for the past two years. In Korea, conversation usually turned to the subject of home and the inevitable rotation. The Major expressed his point of view to his fellow airmen who in turn urged him to put his ideas in writing. Being graduated from Illinois Wesleyan University in 1941, he saw action over Guadalcanal and Munda with VMF-223. For his action there and in Korea Major Steinkraus wears 5 DFCs and 16 Air Medals. At the present he is Assistant G-1, 1st MAW in Korea and more than likely still discussing the rotation problem.



MAJ STEINKRAUS

☛ When **Col William K. Jones** (then LtCol) became a battalion commander in the 6th Marines just before Tarawa, he was 27 years old — the youngest battalion commander in the Marine Corps. During the course of his military career he has been awarded the Navy Cross, the Silver Star and the Bronze Star.

During the post-war years he was better known as "Base Plate McGurk," the transparent disguise he adopted in writing the series of articles for the *GAZETTE* in 1947 and '48.

Col Jones came into the Corps after being graduated from the University of Kansas in 1937 and during WW II served in almost every capacity from platoon leader to Bn

commander — all service with the 1st Bn, 6th Marines. Following the war he served on the staff at MCS, then as Attache in Sweden. Returning, he was with G-3, HQMC, G-3, 1st MarDiv, '53 and now G-3 at MCS.

In a foreword to his book, *Base Plate McGurk*, Col Jones writes, "... the book is concerned with the ways and means, the object being of course, not to set forth *the* way or *the* means, but rather to show *a* way or *a* means."

In his *Amphibious Incursion* on page 37 he again presents *a* way and *a* means.

☛ **Colonel George C. Reinhardt** who has written numerous articles for the *GAZETTE* gives us a sound rebuttal to the faint-hearted once again in his *Who Said Impossible?* (page 10).

Now retired after 30 years of Army military service, he lives in Santa Monica, Calif., where, as a consultant to the Rand Corporation. He spends his spare time writing on his favorite subject, the atomic age. His second edition of *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat* has just been published and in the spring, his new book *American Strategy in the Atomic Age* will be released.

☛ **Captain Edward S. Stallknecht** spent his first year as the Head of the Classified Files Unit at HQMC, battling the obstacles and problems that confronted him. He put in his next year changing things into what he thought was a sensible system of custody and accountability for a classified custodian. The first three months of the third year he kept occupied compiling data which was presented to the CMC as a recommendation for simplified administration in classified files work. The gist of those recommendations were used in writing *Classified* on page 63.



CAPT
STALLKNECHT

Commissioned in 1948 as an LDO (Administrative) he is now awaiting his fifth tour of overseas duty. In the interim, he is serving on the SecNav's Committee for the study of safeguarding official information.



Mrs. Donald Cummings, Jr., and her young son Donald

"I WASN'T ALONE ANY MORE"

Most of us know what it is like to have a telephone. But have you ever thought what it would be like if it wasn't there, even for a little while?

Here are some good words along that line from Mrs. Donald Cummings, Jr.

"When we moved into our new house," she told us a few weeks ago, "I felt a little strange—with a young baby and all—and I couldn't seem to get a feeling of being settled and at home.


"Then the telephone was put in. And suddenly everything seemed different. I could call people! I felt better about being by myself in the house with the baby. I felt better about my mother who had been ill in Boston. And about my husband in uniform far away.

"And then I realized that it wasn't just the telephone calls I could make—it was that people could call me if necessary. I wasn't alone any more."

BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM

Reminding you that someone, somewhere, would like to hear your voice today.





❶ "ATOMIC WEAPONS RENDER IMPOSSIBLE another landing like that on the beaches of Normandy."

That frequently heard, little understood pronouncement gives not the slightest hint of the impact of atomic missiles upon large scale tactical operations, amphibious or other types. It would be equally true to pontificate that "another landing like that in Normandy is rendered impossible by the presence of 150 hostile divisions on the coast to be invaded." Enemy air superiority or our own inability to com-


mand the seas would invoke the same judgment.

Looked at in reverse, we can positively assert that atomic weapons render impossible another operation like St. Lo, like Anzio or, for that matter, single base (Pusan type) invasion support. All those are "impossibles"—and equally meaningless. As well say, *reductio ad absurdum*, "The Roman Legion cannot exist in the face of machine guns."

The significance of the obvious reflection that Normandy's massed landings could have been shattered

by atomic missiles lies in its tacit demand that we examine amphibious operations in the light of these new weapons. *Principles* of war continue unaltered but the tactics, logistics, organization and equipment employed to *apply* those principles may have to undergo alterations almost, if not quite, as drastic as those occurring in weapons "hardware."

Precisely how altered organizations, procedures and new equipment are made ready prior to combat needs is the age-old problem of



Skeptics are wrong! Atomic
warfare and amphibious
operations are compatible

Impossible?

By

Col George C. Reinhardt, USA



military men confronted by novel, potent means of destruction. Study by many minds; unbiased examination of innumerable ideas; planning, accompanied by frequent practical tests in maneuvers; these comprise the test of centuries. Nations which ignored them are listed among the "lost civilizations" of recorded history.

Happily, the problem for the USA contains as much of encouragement as it does of concern. Atomic missiles are a two-edged sword. Admitting that Gen Eisenhower's

"Overlord" host would have been duck soup targets for the atom's super blasts, we should not forget the converse — liberal sprinkling of packaged catastrophes among the garrison of "Festung Europa" at H-hour could have converted the bloody shambles of Omaha beach into an unopposed landing exercise!

Numerous articles in the *New York Times* and other papers credit this country with a tremendous superiority in numbers, types and quality of atomic weapons. It is hoped that American scientific-tech-

nological skill will not permit that advantage to diminish. On the contrary, it should increase. Another point to remember: the nuclear components of atomic weapons are not subject to deterioration like other weapons, nor to obsolescence like much amphibious equipment in an era of unprecedented technological progress.

Studies seeking the optimum amphibious tactics and logistic support for atomic warfare's operations will be misleading if they concentrate mainly upon defense against super

weapons. Rather, they should emphasize the amphibious capabilities of flexible sea-air power to effectively employ atomic missiles in mass, and strenuously exploit their striking power by highly mobile landing forces.

Amphibious operations have become a characteristic American mode of warfare. Always a superb

amphibious campaign, into Sicily against Syracuse, that shattered her strength. Before the walls of that city, the Athenians failed to exploit surprise or maneuver and were appallingly negligent of their logistics.

During the course of centuries, the influence of amphibious operations upon warfare has ebbed and flowed. Decisive in all wars of the

decisive conflict. If there was no embattled landing against bitter beach defense at Yorktown, neither was such the hallmark of Okinawa, rightly labelled an outstanding amphibian victory.


Every one of our nation's conflicts, and particularly The War Between the States, involved amphibious actions; occasionally disastrous like the British capture of Washington in 1814, but more often key contributions to final victory such as the relentless assaults upon Confederate seaports.

But all this historical lore has a limited utility. If there is one aspect of future warfare which, above all others, must *not* be planned in the image of the past, that one is amphibious tactics. No other type of operations will be more critically affected by rapidly developing technologies in equipment, logistics and, pre-eminently, by atomic weapons. History can tell us much of value by analogy and deduction, while we keep our attention riveted upon principles. When we apply those principles to conditions prevailing today—and tomorrow—we must forsake the past to derive new methods, make best use of new means and, simultaneously, guard against new dangers.

The hue and cry attendant upon the first use of atomic weapons in warfare centered the attention of the American people upon the strategic aspects of those weapons to the almost utter exclusion of tactics. Of all tactics, only the amphibious phase was, at that time, ever mentioned in the same breath with atomic weapons.

No one ever considered the impact of the super weapon upon mammoth land battlefields or awesome fleet actions upon the high seas, though World War II had its fill of both, from Stalingrad to Leyte Gulf. But they accepted, without argument, that "amphibious operations were impossible" against a foe who could blast the landing armada with atomic missiles. We have already considered the superficiality of that conclusion. A weighty question remains: what *will* be the impact of atomic weapons upon amphibious campaign plans and execution?

We must first realize that atomic



Super weapons—no one considered the impact

tool of predominant sea power, though seldom adequately recognized as such (even by the nations that employed them), they are peculiarly adapted to a United States sea-air strategy which substitutes surprise and mobility for dependence upon sheer numbers. Experience amassed by our forces in 61 major (division size or larger) landings without a defeat during World War II offers today's planners an invaluable legacy.

Less known, perhaps because of historians' penchant for slighting them, are a wealth of equally decisive amphibious actions in other lands at more distant times. The Greco-Persian wars, first momentous clash between eastern and western civilizations, were decided in favor of the West when Athens abandoned her capital, staked all on amphibious operations and won at Salamis. She continued her success with sea-borne armies against Sparta's preponderant man power, employing mobility and water-borne envelopment to nullify mass. Yet, ironically, it was Athens' greatest

Mediterranean basin; mainstay of England's struggle against Napoleon; land-sea campaigns were either ignored, or clumsily staged throughout the 20th Century's first 40 years.

But we need go no farther afield than North America to unearth a wealth of amphibious experience. Two brilliant land-sea campaigns, Louisbourg (at the mouth of the St. Lawrence River) and Quebec, settled once and for all that the continent would be predominantly English instead of French. A difficult and complicated Combined—as well as Joint—amphibious campaign won American independence at Yorktown. The French Adm de Grasse secured command of the sea by beating Graves' British fleet off the Chesapeake Capes and landed French troops. He did more. He convoyed Washington's army from Elkton and Annapolis to the Yorktown peninsula, saving marches of 425 miles in one case, 300 in the other. Not only did this permit Washington to concentrate a fateful two weeks sooner, it provided him with fresh troops at the scene of the

missiles are no longer the private weapon of strategic air power. As publicly announced, they can now be fired from army cannon; delivered by tac-air; borne aloft by naval aircraft from large carriers. According to releases such as those in *U.S. News & World Report* we are little short of producing guided missiles and rockets as delivery agents, both of which will be suitable for employment by armies, navies and air forces in only slightly differing types. There is no further room for doubt that the atomic missile is a tactical, as well as a strategic, weapon.

Gone also is the illusion that the only targets for atomic missiles are urban areas or industrial complexes of vast extent; immovable (one might say un-missable) aiming points for bombers. Armies, fleets and air forces, together with the logistic installations of all three (whether ports, dock yards, air bases or depots) will undergo atomic attack wherever that attack can be pushed home.

It is simple logic to assume that atomic weapons will be delivered against the enemy in a future war by every available means: submarines no less than heavy bombers; guided missile cruisers and carriers; the artillery of land forces as well as that of naval elements.

Hostile armies, navies and air forces will, as always, be the primary (and will probably remain the principal) targets in warfare. Substituting atomic missiles for conventional ones is unlikely to change that priority. Modern cities, especially vulnerable, with their teeming population may be attacked, sometimes as acts of vengeful rage, sometimes as part of a strategic concept (once attributed to Douhet) that nations can be defeated by sheer terror. (The Mongols were masters of that by no means novel concept.) Losses resulting from such attacks will be immense, their drain upon national resources staggering. But wars are unlikely to be decided wholly, or even in major part, by them.


If it did nothing else, WW II must have convinced the thoughtful that destruction for destruction's sake is at best a costly road to victory. Unless the world reverts to policies of literal extermination, it is more

profitable to destroy the enemy's armed forces and take over cities and industry intact.

Stalemate warfare which tempts baffled high commands to resort to city bombing cannot recur. Amphibious and airborne capabilities wedded to atomic weapons preclude it. Therefore, American and Allied sea power must not be partially em-

theory beyond mere threats to actual amphibious strikes—which are immeasurably strengthened by employing atomic weapons.

Amphibious operations, amenable to the wide tactical variations of land combat, fall functionally into three broad classifications—according to mission. First is the stupendous operation designed to push an in-



Total destruction—a costly way to victory

played as in WW I, where British strategy forgot its traditional role. Gallipoli violated every principle of joint operations. The almost unguarded German seacoast never felt the might of Allied naval superiority and the blood bath of the Somme resulted. In a future war, sea power must be fully exploited, even into the "narrow waters" of the foe, as it was in the Central Pacific campaigns after the Battle of Midway.

This is no novel concept. Von Clausewitz, arch prophet of land warfare, displayed his appreciation of amphibious potentials when he outlined a mythical (1820) European war. With England allied to Prussia against France, half the former's army should remain in England because "dominant sea power and the extent of French coast would result in this force tying down more than twice its strength in French troops devoted to defense of their shores." The ideas behind that century old study could scarcely be more appropriate to current US strategy, if we extend the Clausewitzian

vasion into an extensive land area; second, the island-seizure type where the objective is not appreciably larger than a comfortable beachhead and the defender is unable to reinforce without regaining command of the sea; the third could be described as the raid in which a port or other key point is seized, either to be held or merely destroyed and evacuated.

Each of these functional types can be either shore-to-shore or ship-to-shore maneuvers, depending normally upon the distance to be travelled between the friendly base and the objective. On occasion, the "far shore" may be a river's bank, a type of operation widely employed on the Mississippi and tributary rivers between 1861-65 and then "rediscovered" in the liberation of the Philippines eight decades later. Sometimes the "far shore" will lie along the embarkation point's coastline as in New Guinea. Here the amphibious operation becomes in fact a water-borne turning movement.


Conditions favoring this maneuver

are: possibility of achieving surprise; speed of execution compared with movement overland (considering both hostile opposition and terrain difficulties); and logistic capabilities of alternate land and water routes. Without these conditions the operation should be viewed with scepticism.

The great Sir John Moore re-

missiles can reverse the picture?

There American sea and air power appears more vital than ever. Undue emphasis is given the fact that almost no air superiority or AA defense net can prevent occasional sneak raids. Single plane attacks can carry an atomic wallop, hence every major base exists only by enemy sufferance. That, of course,



British Info Services

Huge logistic concentrations — no longer practical

fused to sail from Portugal to Coruna in the Napoleonic Wars declaring: "the disruption of embarkation and debarkation will far exceed the rigors of an overland march." The X Corps in Korea could have marched direct to Wonsan at least a vital two weeks faster than it reached there via Pusan and waterborne envelopment, to be, allegedly, greeted by Bob Hope. (Its logistic support, of course, would still have come by water to Wonsan.) Yet Japanese amphibious operations of this nature completely disrupted British defense plans on the Malay Peninsula in 1941-2.

But to return to the three functional classifications, atomic weapons favor the attacker in the seizure and raid. Local defenses or small islands can be smothered by atomic blows delivered suddenly. Unless the enemy can retaliate, atomically, with exceptional speed, his island or base will be overrun by the landing force. The unpleasant aspect of that reflection is, of course, just what use can we make of so limited an area after its capture since hostile atomic

is thinking in terms of Normandy beaches.

Properly organized and operated, no base can be destroyed by a single hastily delivered atomic bomb. There, too, our great preponderance of atomic weapon quantity and quality is a most encouraging factor. By present indications we will have many bombs to expend for each one of the enemy. Hanson Baldwin (*New York Times*) says that an "era of atomic bombs in the thousands is at hand for the USA." Published opinions of unofficial, thoughtful commentators regarding all other nations' stockpiles never exceed 200 at the close of 1953.

Conservative references in the *Foreign Affairs Quarterly* estimate USSR atomic achievements at about one half of ours six years ago—or before the first reported Soviet explosion. It is questionable whether an enemy's atomic missiles will be expanded on "sneak raids" when bases no longer resemble those on coral atolls almost sinking under the weight of construction and equipment.

The massed amphibious forces, characteristic of invasion-type operations in the last war, do appear suicidal until a foe's atomic capability is utterly smashed. However, that type of campaign is the least attractive strategically against a foe outnumbering us in man power. We need not risk a decision against odds, mass versus mass, when an expanse of hostile seacoast offers our mobile sea-air power the opportunity of retaining the initiative, keeping the opponent off balance.

Several developments since 1945 suggest that it is possible to overthrow the main armies of the enemy without resorting to the concentration of an "Overlord." First, the old axiom, "invasion beaches must be within range of land based tac-air" is less valid. Today's aerial atomic support with its longer radius of action flies from carriers as well as runways. Second, atomic warfare's tactical realities contain a germ of truth regarding dispersion. Huge concentrations of men and materiel in a few square miles along a beach (or anywhere) pose unacceptable risks. Third, tomorrow's logistics may be able to do without old style constricted harbors and ports. Fourth, progress in both fixed and rotary wing air transport suggests an intermixture of airborne operations with amphibious to degrees previously impractical.

Each of these have engrossing implications for major amphibious campaigns. Reflecting upon atomic armed air support, we may ponder whether a floating base is any more vulnerable to atomic destruction than the huge, slow to construct, jet airfield. Certainly the floating base is the smaller target, more difficult to locate and not condemned to immobility. Nor is construction of a new carrier much slower than the extent of concrete demanded for land based jets.

Planes able to land and take off from the water appear to enjoy the only runways invulnerable to atomic blows. Water areas, even flooded marshlands, frequently found or readily "constructed" along most coasts, would be hard to neutralize by bombing. Current handicaps of sea-planes; slow speed, restricted maneuverability, need for long stretches of quiet water, have discouraged ventures into such fields.

If the new trend signalized by Ernest G. Stout's *Sea Dart* eliminates seaplane inferiority, water landing areas will leap into tactical importance.

On the second point, the relative nature of mass is too often overlooked. A regimental combat team is mass against a force that cannot concentrate three battalions. Surely our more numerous atomic weapons can deny our foe the capability of "massing" to extents impossible for ourselves.

"Dispersion" in atomic warfare begins (in terms of today's organizations) above the battalion level. Tactical units approximating 1,000 men cannot be deployed widely enough to reduce casualties from a super weapon's direct hit without sacrificing their combat effectiveness. Thus, atomic deployment becomes the responsibility of regimental and higher commanders. Battalion teams must continue to operate in much the same formations; depending upon mobility and concealment, not internal dispersion.

The new "mass" will be a matter of co-ordinated actions by relatively small, hard hitting, fast moving units. Here, too, atomic warfare's challenge, this time to leadership at all levels: initiative at battalion; skilled maneuver higher up—puts American fighting men at no disadvantage.

Thus, when sea and air logistics can, together, support a number of separated thrusts (when beaches or landing zones are numerous), we do not need "Overlord's" concentrated 5 divisions for D-day assault. Nor do we need the unbroken length of suitable beach whose rarity makes major landings too easy for a defender to forecast.

The third point, seaborne logistics, conventional style, have their Achilles' heel in their ports. But with cargo discharged swiftly and efficiently over beaches (and ports of embarkation protected by keeping hostile atomic bases or delivery agencies at a distance), that weakness is largely eliminated.


Not quite 10 years ago, across-Channel pipe lines and artificial harbors were startling innovations. Are improved means for getting supplies over the beach any more "impossible" for tomorrow? Can we not devise ocean transport on the tractor-

trailer principle? We need atomic age vessels which beach their cargo sections and (tractor style) pick up an "empty" to sail at once. Their shallow draft reduces mine hazards, their speed foils submarines.

Until hostile atomic capability will support attacks on individual cargo vessels, water transport enjoys less vulnerability than its land

with sizable problems. That is a far cry from "impossible." Rather it recalls Mahan's teaching: "Whatever the tactical difficulties involved, the strategic necessities compel a diligent study of how to meet them." If part of our difficulties stem from logistics instead of tactics, the advice remains sound.

Let us therefore survey our am-



Floating bases—smaller targets not condemned to immobility

counterparts. Ships at sea can "disperse" more readily than land transport. Although lineal targets such as rail lines, highways and pipelines are not worth an atomic missile's immense destructive power, immovable rail yards and highway junctions can be easily shattered to render rail and road networks unuseable.

Reference the fourth and final item: we are barely beginning, both tactically and logistically, to integrate air transport into military operations. Helicopter progress makes the rotary wing aircraft ideal for relatively short hauls of men and equipment, direct from ships at sea to a fighting front miles inland. Achievements in heavy fixed wing planes open vistas for longer range air movements. When these are adapted to water landings their value increases. No aspect of warfare meshes more readily with airborne potentials than amphibious operations. Their "marriage" is essential for atomic combat.

Nothing in what we have discussed precludes amphibious operations in tactical atomic warfare, though it does confront planners

with a phibious state of readiness for operations in the atomic age. Three phases, sometimes crowded into each other, but more normally spread over lengthy periods of time, characterize all amphibious campaigns. These are: (1) preparatory; occupied with planning, training and intelligence, (2) movement and assault; everything from assembly on friendly shores to and including the landing, and (3) final; in which the objective is seized and the seizure exploited.

Whether we know it or not, the United States should be already deeply involved in Phase 1 of the next amphibious operations our armed forces may have to undertake.

All three features under the preparatory phase require "lead time"—often erroneously believed applicable only to industrial procurement. That bugaboo of logistic planners can lower the boom upon tacticians and intelligence officers, too. Neither training nor intelligence can wait for a formal declaration of war—or another Pearl Harbor—if our essential "retaliatory actions" are to

include the amphibious strikes vital to over-all success.

Amphibious operations cannot be ordered on the spur of the moment. As Secretary of War Elihu Root's 1902 report noted: "It is easy for a President, or a general acting under his direction, to order that 50,000 or 100,000 men proceed to Cuba and capture Havana. To make an order

amphibious campaigns against odds in all other aspects of military might. Our organization must be revamped to land faster, cross the beach more swiftly, provide greater mobility and shock action on D-day itself and, especially, to fight in self contained small-size task forces. Our equipment and weapons, other than atomic, need re-evaluation to cast

in training our assault units?

Intelligence, revamped under stress in the past decade, is functioning, properly wrapped in secrecy. We may hope that every element of strategic intelligence which can now be gathered receives adequate attention. Tactical intelligence we know must be sharpened and speeded up to meet the exigencies of mobile atomic warfare. Precise information regarding local political situations becomes an essential innovation for amphibious campaigns against a vast heterogeneous enemy. The inhabitants' attitude, accurately forecast, may materially affect those operations.

All this adds up to an immense preparatory effort, yet one that is entirely possible once we admit its necessity. If the United States is compelled to again wage war in defense of world freedom, amphibious operations, large scale and widely dispersed, cannot be delayed for 10 months after the start of hostilities as were Guadalcanal and North Africa.

Strategically selected, vigorously prosecuted, atomically supported amphibious strikes can achieve more to unbalance the aggressor's steam roller than greater effort expended in meeting him head on. To capitalize on this economy of force we need atomic weapons and varied delivery agents. These we possess. We also require changes in our organizational doctrine to exploit the principle of self-reliant, but controlled and coordinated, task forces at approximately battalion level. These task forces must have combat equipment and streamlined logistic support suitable for their missions. Airborne potentials, tactical as well as logistic, must be sagely, not rashly, incorporated into amphibious operations.

Finally, as the foundation of all the rest, we must have national recognition and acceptance of these facts. Amphibious operations will assume increasing importance in the United States' strategy. Atomic warfare furnishes American arms with their best tactical weapon against overwhelming numbers. Amphibious operations and atomic warfare are by no means incompatible. Actually, it may be in their adroit union that we shall discover a key to victory without annihilation. USMC



Under the atomic cloud—self contained task forces

which has any reasonable chance of being executed he must do a great deal more than that."

Undoubtedly "a great deal more" is in progress today. The lesson of "too little and too late" has been pounded home. Our concern should be directed toward insuring that our preparatory planning, training and intelligence meets the challenge—and fully utilizes the potential—of atomic weapons.

Planning encounters a peculiar handicap—our unbroken succession of amphibious victories in the past war. The fact of victory suggests continuing in the same mould, obscuring mistakes perpetrated in winning. Only defeat compels reflection. Thus the Germans entered World War II with tank tactics that overwhelmed superior (number and quality) tanks of the French in 1940.

We must therefore make certain that our superiority in atomic weapons is matched by our skill in the tactics of their employment. But we cannot rely on that advantage alone to swing the scale in tomorrow's


out the obsolescent and introduce those which fit our designed tactics and organization. Multiplicity of wheels does not automatically enhance mobility. Complex wire nets cannot assure communications on atomic battlefields.

Training is being served by successive amphibious maneuvers, testing the joint and unified nature of every amphibious operation. But are there some elements of that training which are, like some of the equipment it employs, obsolete? Have we realistically tested atomic potentials (both offensive and defensive) in recent maneuvers? Are we training enough manpower for expanded amphibious operations? Should we not train—and organize—battalion task forces for tactical and logistic independence in action while improving communications for their remote control by higher echelons. Are the implications of airborne combat units (parachute, fixed and rotary wing types) plus air transport's capability to "jump over" the beach sufficiently stressed

in brief

pass. This new compass will enable small craft to navigate for the first time with a direct true-north accuracy. The Navy hopes the 9-pound gyro will improve beachhead landings, assure precise maneuvers and

search Calculator, the project started back in 1946 with actual construction and testing being under way since 1951. The Navy Bureau of Ordnance's need for a calculator of greater capacity has been filled by this new electronic computer.



The T55 (above), an experimental all-aluminum truck weighing 6,000 pounds less than the conventional models has been developed for possible use in future airborne operations.

The "Idea" truck utilizes a fuel injection system, hydraulic disc brakes and ball joint suspension. It is powered by a waterproof, 6-cylinder 200-horsepower, air-cooled engine capable of speeds over 60 mph.

On the road the truck handles like a passenger car and off the road, under certain conditions, it can outperform track-laying vehicles.

To eliminate duplication in training between Parris Island and Camp Lejeune, PI will drop most of the field training now given during boot camp at the Island. This is now covered thoroughly during the 4-week basic infantry combat training given at Camp Lejeune. Dropped from the PI schedule will be map and compass reading, scouting and patrolling, individual combat principles and fire team and squad formations. Time thus saved will be used for drill and discipline. Close order drill for the individual platoons has been increased from 61 to 97 hours.

The Navy has announced the development of the Mark II, the world's smallest nautical gyro-com-

pinpoint landings in combined arms assault.

Personnel desiring to arrange for housing in advance of their arrival at Camp Pendleton may do so by writing the Base Housing Office, MCB, Camp Pendleton, Calif.

During the period 1-7 September 1954 NATO exercise "Keystone" was held in the Dikili area of western Turkey. The maneuvers proved to be a big success as the Turkish and American troops eliminated the "enemy" threat to Dikili. Following the exercise, the 6th Marines presented a plaque in the name of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Commanding Officer, officers and enlisted men of the 1st Battalion, 42d Regiment. In return a bronze plaque representing the maneuver area at Dikili was presented to the United States Marines in the name of the Commanding General, First Turkish Army. It was recommended that the plaque presented to the US Marines be forwarded to the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines as a memento of their participation in Operation Keystone.

The "smartest" electronic "brain" ever built is what the International Business Machine Corporation calls their new big computer. Designated NORC, for Naval Ordnance Re-

A new supersonic long-range strategic fighter plane—the F-101 Voodoo—has been built by the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation to meet Air Force requirements for a long-range fighter. The F-101 is scheduled to be assigned to the Strategic Air Command. In addition to being in the supersonic class it is capable of carrying atomic weapons. The Voodoo is the fourth plane to be placed in the "Century Series" and is powered by two Pratt and Whitney J-57 turbojet engines.

Marines who are authorized to wear more than eight ribbons (below) are encouraged to wear them in rows of four. This gives a much neater and more soldierly appearance than the top-heavy stacks of three. The Marine Corps Manual (42957) reference states that ordinarily ribbons will be worn in rows of three but, "... when the number involved would make too many rows, ribbons shall be placed in rows of four. However, when the number of ribbons is so great as to cause them to be concealed by the coat lapels, the number of ribbons in each row may be successively decreased to prevent such concealment."



RED ARMOR

They aren't SP artillery! Their job is to furnish
direct fire in support of infantry. They're known as Russia's . . .

TURRETLESS TANKS



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By Garrett Underhill

THE WHOLE WORLD'S TANK terminology is a mess, US Army Armor generals tell us. "Tank," itself, was a cover-name for Britain's first super-secret "armored fighting vehicle." Since then everybody's definition for tanks has differed widely. Hardly any term really gives an idea of an armored vehicle's tactical job. And when you fail to do that, it's bad.

About the worst examples of mislabelled armor items are Soviet Russian "SUs." Lots of people in the West just translate literally the Russian term *samokhodniye ustanovki* and call them self-propelled guns, or SPs for short. Because the Russians sometimes call this type of armor "SAU" (the "A" is for artillery) some Westerners keep thinking SUs are SP artillery—like our field artillery 105s and 155s on armored caterpillar chassis.

This is a terrible mistake; only rarely have they been used on artillery-type indirect fire missions, and then only to the limits of observed fire. (In this the Soviets have agreed with Ft Sill and set the limit at 5,000 meters, or only 500 yards more than our 5,000 yards limit.) The SUs aren't fitted for such indirect fire. They lack the gun traverse for the transfer of such fire across a front. Their job is assault-type direct-laid (scope sighted) fire in support of turreted tanks. They're gigantic sniping rifles. Like the first British tanks (which were for support, too—albeit of infantry), they're armored all over. By the official US Army's definition of a tank, they're tanks—even if they have no turret. (We actually built a similar 100-ton turretless tank late in WW II.)

The Russians started their SU line late in 1942, got the first SUs into action in mid 1943—following a similar line of German armor. This was started by the German's artillery arm before World War II; called "assault artillery," it was a great success in France in 1940 and then in Russia the next year. The Germans used their turretless tanks mainly for supporting infantry.

All these turretless tanks, whether German or Russian, use a standard tank chassis. The gun is mounted in the front hull plate. The gun has

very little traverse, maybe only 17 degrees in all. But there are big advantages. For one thing, you can mount a bigger gun that way than you can in a turret on the same tank chassis. Turrets are big and complex things, too, with power drives and what-not. They account for about a fifth the weight of a tank. Usually they're a tank's most vulnerable feature. Turretless jobs are thus easier and faster to make—harder to kill.

They're also usually much lower. Both Germans and Russians found this was a big asset, especially when fighting armor. The lower the tank, the better you can maneuver unseen. In gun duels, you offer less target.

round main-gun firepower, when you're working deep in enemy positions and territory. Both Germans and Russians have used SUs as substitutes for turreted tanks, but they don't like to. The SUs are supposed to work within friendly infantry formations.

Both Germans and Russians tried mobile, lightly-armored SP antitank tank guns, too. Both gave them up for SUs. Fast "tin plates" can lay ambushes, but they can't take it. When they have to follow up an action by moving out, like ships, into mobile fire-fight they tend to get "creamed." It's better to put your industrial effort in armor that can slug it out, say the World War



So it was that in both German and Russian armies, German assault guns and Red SUs came to double as anti-tank armor. Note that this wasn't a job dreamed up for them. It grew out of plenty of combat experience.

With their 1943 line of Panther turreted tanks and Hunting Panther assault guns, the Germans solved much of the turretless handicap by a crossdrive-type transmission. Like the Allison in our new tank family, it could spin Panthers in place and rotate the whole vehicle. The widely known Russian armor still lacks this efficient, but complex, "Swiss watch type" transmission.

Despite the advantages of turretless tanks, most mobile armored force people nevertheless prefer turreted ones. They afford better all-

II Eastern Fronters. And they've had far more armor war experience than we.

When the SUs first started, they were the German assault guns till 1943. They were an attempt to furnish mobile armored forces with heavy fire support, the lack of which let a whole German armored army escape a well-laid trap at Rostov in November '41. (The Russians are black and blue behind from kicking themselves over this one. Had their encircling and pursuit forces had the heavy mobile firepower, the Germans might have been licked the month before Pearl Harbor. Hitler could never have survived the loss of von Kleist's panzer divisions.)

But the old-line Artillery wasn't mobile-minded enough to handle the



job. So the mobile force—the Tank and Mechanized Troops, took over the SUs in '43. (The Russians never did have SP field artillery like ours; only towed cannon.)

It is therefore a moot point whether the Russians' warning against using SUs for indirect fire (and the inability to so fire), may not be the result of inter-arm rivalry in Russia. In our pre-Pearl Harbor US Army, the Coast Artillery wouldn't let their flak guns be fitted for (or perform) dual-purpose jobs, lest the Field Artillery lay claim to all Army flak and so cause union of all Artillery in one arm (as now). In the Soviet Army, it could be that the building of SUs to do only assault tank-type jobs, keeps the Artillery from putting up a strong claim for retaking them. The SUs show that the Reds have their service rivalries and how lots of things which the Reds now say they

thought up were discovered by accident. And, in smugly accepting past accidents as current SOP, the Reds can be missing out on what they ought to be doing now.

If they really went back and thought things out from scratch, they might come up with something different—perhaps a whole new armored force weapons system.


Besides being tops in the main characteristics of armor as stressed by the Soviets—low build and good gunpower—SUs naturally take after the turreted tanks whose chassis they use for high mobility. They're actually lighter than their turreted counterparts. But their box-like fighting compartments aren't as well shaped or armored as their counterparts' turrets.

The SU-100 is the latest of the turretless tank line. It uses a T-34 hull. Instead of the T-34's 85, it mounts a long 100mm gun up front

in the hull. The gun's adapted from an old Red Navy flak job. It fires a 34½ lb, HE shell. As a towed antitank and corps artillery piece, the SU-100 can send this shell almost 23,000 yards. Theoretically, the SU-100 could do as well if it parked on a slope to gain the needed elevation lacking in the SU's gun mount. The HE trajectory is nice and flat for easy scope aiming and the 100mm armor-piercing projectiles travel around 3,000 feet a second at the muzzle. The ammo is easier to handle in the SU-100 than in the heavy tank, so all in all, the SU-100 has become the preferred tank-vs-tank fighter of all Red divisions.

Weighing in at 33 tons, it's closer to the original T-34's 32-ton design than the somewhat overloaded 35-ton T-34/85. (The first T-34 type SU mounted the 85mm, changed to the 100mm to see action in '44).

With the crew of four, the gun



Left, JSU 122s
—not first-rate

All photos by
SOVFOTO

**JSU 152s—"neither
snow, nor rain . . ."**



SU 85—highly maneuverable

breach, ammo and other vital gear, the fighting compartment is packed. Fortunately for the commander, a T-34 cupola has been fitted on the right, the gunner and loader have each a periscope; the driver has two periscopes. Pistol ports for the PPS tommy gun appear on front and sides. But there's no AA MG.

The JSU-152 is the other major SU. It uses the Joseph Stalin tank chassis. Previous SU-152s used the KV chassis. The JSUs are much the same as the KV-types, the main difference being that the rear of the hull slopes forward, instead of being flat up and down as on the KV. The JSUs are rated by the Reds at a Stalin's weight—just over 50 tons.

The 152 is a little-changed corps artillery 152mm M1937 gun-howitzer. It retains the characteristic fluted muzzle-brake of the Soviet Artillery's favorite World War II slugger. As a towed gun, the 152 ranges over 19,000 yards. With 85 to 88 lb projectiles, it's got great slugging power and HE effect. It can really tear a place down. It was good for quick wrecking of the stone buildings in which Germans would hole up, when they wanted to deny Red armor some crossroad or stream ford. Like SU-100s the JSU-152 can work against tanks and other targets at 3,000 yards and better. Theoretically, it attains the towed carriage's maximum range if parked on a slope. But for tank fighting this 152 lacks velocity; is slower in rate of fire than the Stalin 122. Its obvious main use is HE support firing against targets bothering the forward tanks.

JSUs have the same sort of vision and pistol layout as an SU-100, but no cupola. However, like Stalin tanks, their commander (right front corner) has a DSHK 12.7mm (cal .50) AA-MG mounted in front of his hatch.

The JSU-122 is also around. It mounts the artillery 122 which is the corps medium gun and "companion" to the medium 152 howitzer (for it uses the same carriage in towed form). This was the gun altered in '43 to a proper tank gun for the Stalin tanks, so you can see that this unaltered JSU isn't Red "first-rate" for use in armored warfare.

JSUs have mounted the tank 122 with muzzle-brake, too. But there's not much point to this armament in a high JSU layout when there are turreted Stalins around—which are about as low. Hence, these JSUs aren't really standard nor liked. They're examples of Russian effort to make use of what wartime pro-

duction lines were turning out in the way of cannon and chassis. It exemplifies their determination to produce 122mm tanks even if facilities were lacking to produce turreted ones of that gunpower.

The common SU-76 is a 12-ton makeshift World War II attempt to salvage the facilities for the lightly armored T-70 light tank chassis. When the turreted 45mm gun T-70 failed completely in '43, the Reds had plenty of producing capacity for it. Since the Stalin Gun Factory's M1942 76mm gun was pouring off production lines by then, it was a natural to mate with an elongated T-70 chassis as a makeshift piece of mobile firepower.

The SU-76 tried and failed as a tank destroyer. In '43 the big Panthers and Tigers were appearing. Whereas you can kill any tank in the 50-ton class at 500 yards with 76mm hyper-velocity, tungsten-carbide core shot, trying it from a high

SU 76—an industrial expedient



thin-plate SU-76 is tough.

Since the war the SU-76 has served in Soviet Rifle Regiment's Cannon Companies. Nevertheless, it has not solved the Soviet's perpetual headache over getting proper cannon for the infantry accompanying job. Some Soviet authorities say the infantry should have an SP howitzer instead, to get at targets in defilade.

Also, experience has shown it just doesn't do to try and make armored combat vehicles out of commercial automotive components. The SU-76 uses two coupled Hudson-type 110 h.p. engines, plus other commercial items. This results in a vulnerable front drive, gasoline fuel and other undesirable features—including fuel tanks up front. The SU-76 is also high, and while late models are covered over instead of open-topped, the armor is still thin. The SU-76's only advantage is that it carries plenty of ammo.

Other Types

The Soviets also had special tanks—flail-tanks, flame-throwing tanks (pioneered by the Russians well before World War II), rocket-launching tanks and recovery tanks. The Russians have always been tops at tank recovery and repair since the early days of World War II.

Don't think that Russians are all mechanically inept. You may see some new tankers kick their tank in exasperation, as if it were a balky mule. But the Germans found Soviet Army maintenance outfits so good, that they "asked" these mechanics to "volunteer" for the German service. Russian tankers used to be very jealous of American ability to build reliable automotive equipment, but wartime experience enabled Russians to leap ahead in this respect. Marshal Rotmistrov, Russia's tank authority, said some years ago that the question of reliability is no longer a factor in the long-range use of Red armor.

Airborne tanks were first used by the Russians. Big, 4-engined ANT-6 bombers landed them in the 1935 Minsk maneuvers and again in the taking-over of part of Romania in 1940. It was the 5-ton propeller driven amphibious tankettes they wafted aloft, secured between the landing gear and under the fuselage, partly in the bomb bay. However, Antonov (the glider man) worked

out a glider attachment for such tanks, to enable them to be towed—instead of carried—by powered aircraft. None of these developments had any World War II combat use, but they indicate that the Reds will think of everything—and try it.

In addition to their own equipment, the Reds received great quantities of all kinds of war material from the Allies throughout the war.

The Russians got just over 4,000 M4 Shermans during World War II, although their tank production finally out-paced ours as to quantity. They were no match for the contemporary German 50-ton Panthers.

Of the 1,400 M3 Lees the Russians got, General Solomatin said as late as 1949: "Frankly, I can't conceive of how the Americans ever came to design such a tank." You shouldn't be surprised then, if some of your own, Allied, Satellite or German obsolete armor ever confronts you.



MA 65—with the "Bobik" the Russians send out a child to do a man's job

Recon Armor

With the BA-65, the Russians send a child to do a man's job—and indeed "bobik" (child) is the Russians' nickname for this little Ford, 4-wheeled armored car. A World War II design, it's very light (2.4 tons) and very lightly armored. Protection is really against only ordinary ball ammunition and not-so-fast-travelling shell fragments. There's a sort of clumsy revolving open-topped turret towards the rear, in which the vehicle commander sits. The "bobik" mounts only a DT 7.62mm (cal .30) tank machine gun as armament.

The engine's overloaded even so, and without dual rear wheels and proper all-wheel drive the "bobik" is a very, very poor excuse for a recon vehicle. It's just what its Soviet title says: an armored auto.

Far from being a cross-country prowler, it bogs down even on muddy roads. Its only good point is the sloping layout of the plate armor, well-designed to shed bullets.

Armored Flak

Lack of "flakpanzers"—tracked flak tanks to protect armor on the march and in attack against air strafing—is what the Germans attribute much of their later wartime troubles to, especially when up against Anglo-American air power. For most of World War II, various conditions on the Eastern Front caused air power there (though almost wholly employed in tactical roles) to be far less effective than in the West. Hence the Soviets as well as Germans were not as conscious of the need for flakpanzers as they obviously should have been.

The best tracked—and armored—flak the Russians did have was American. They had a few of the M15 with a 37mm Colt automatic cannon (a poor weapon) and two .50s. They got a full 1,000 of the famous M17 with four .50s. What it can do in antipersonnel as well as in flak work has been well borne out in Korea.

The only home-made flak shown by the Russians, has been single-barrel Bofors 37mm (like our 40) on an open-top mount on a T-70 light tank chassis. Equally inadequate have been the one or two DSHK cal .50s set up in truck cargo bodies on their tripods, as shown in Moscow parades—or twin naval-type Bofors 25mm mounts, similarly carried in trucks. But German half-track mounted, 20mm single and quad 20mm guns, as well as single-mount 37mm, were taken in great numbers by the Soviets.

Armored Personnel Carriers

Since the Russians have pioneered armored warfare—and have made so many revolutionary advances in armored vehicles—it's amazing they've been so backward on an item now proven so vital.

The British were the first to come

up with such carriers, and during World War II the Soviets got some of these open-topped little "Bren Gun Carriers" via Lend-Lease. America was really next, with the familiar half-track — of which the Russians got just over 1,000. The German panzer divisions actually used motorized — not armored — infantry for their blitz of Poland and France. Only for the Russian campaign in 1941 did they begin to get their fine armored half-tracks. So necessary did this prove for that type of open warfare, that the next year the Germans started converting their motorized (truck-carried) infantry division to "panzer grenadiers" — carried in armored tracked vehicles, though these were open-topped.

The Russians started tank riding before World War II. But the way the Soviets ride their tanks in combat, it's sheer suicide. To get some infantry into or through an enemy position, in World War II the Russians were willing to take 30 per cent losses in tank riders.

But in 1951 they amazed the military world by trotting out a new "armored transporter" which is definitely the lowest man-carrier on the armored totem pole. It's just a 2½-ton truck chassis without the double tires on the dual rear wheels. On it is installed a thin armored covering, somewhat like that of the ancient and ineffective US M3 Scout Car. Only the driver has overhead protection. The vehicle is plainly overloaded and the chassis less fitted for cross-country travel than a World War II 6x6 truck.

There are those who think that this armored transporter is only another makeshift — that the Soviets may be perfecting a semi-track rendering a far more suitable modern vehicle than the present atrocity. There are those, too, who think that it's not necessarily a grave fault for these carriers not to be covered.

These authorities don't like "armored boxes," like our new T-18 and the revolutionary T-59. General Grow, for instance, often fought his infantry mounted in World War II. He says that with open-topped armored transporters like the Russian personnel and weapons carrier, you can do this; with tracked armored boxes, you can't.

Watch Out for New Red Armor

We must be sure to bear in mind that Soviet Russian armor today is neither modern, nor very satisfactory to the Russians. Consider their main armor — turret tanks and SUs. All the guns and all the tanks basically date back years. The DT machine guns go back to 1926, the DSHK MGs to 1934-38. The cannon (76s, 85s, 100s, 122s, 152s) all are 1930 jobs, originally designed for something other than tank fighting. As for the tanks, the T-34s themselves go back to 1937, the Stalins to 1938-39. Their remarkable 500 to 600 V2K diesel is something the Kharkov people spent most of the 1930s developing.

Can we presume that the Russians will remain satisfied with this old, wartime-refurbished armor and firepower, when they've done so well lately with the MIG jet fighter in aviation?

When the T-34 and Stalin did show up against the Germans in 1941, they came as a terrible surprise — both as to the fact they existed at all, and as to their revolutionary mobility, firepower and protection. Despite their intelligence work, the Germans were amazed. They were forced to rush out Tigers and Panthers in reply. And, in turn, we were forced to Pershings and Pattons.

Yet, the Germans and the rest of the West previously had been smugly complacent about Red armor. The only tanks we'd known of were a 1931-34 "family" built to British Vickers and US Christie designs.

Our position is now equally delicate. Many authorities go around comparing Pattons designed in 1950-52, to T-34s of 1937-39. They compare our new "family" to the Russians' old one.

There's been too much talk of how we're going to stop Red armor with cheap weapons — like shaped charges for bazookas and recoilless guns, squash-head shells for artillery, baby atomic bombs for fighter-bombers and heavy artillery.

The Russians read this stuff. They note what we do. They've had plenty of experience with German recoilless guns and bazookas — and Reds and Germans had shaped charges in World War II from 1941

on. They've seen our antitank stuff work in Korea. Our new tank "family" is now practically an open book.

Pessimistically, sooner or later we can expect a new Russian tank family, built to try to foil our best tank and antitank weapons (the way the KVs and T-34s did the Germans in '41). Most likely it'll be designed too, to out-class our armor and other forces in fitness for modern mobile tactics and technique.

History teaches us that — especially if troops are mentally prepared for it — the surprise debut of such a force needn't spell either defeat or disaster.

In '41 the KVs took the 6th Panzer Division utterly by surprise at Rossieny — tactically and technically. They soon got in among the German division artillery on the road used as the division's principle axis of advance. It looked as if the German survivors would get to Siberia faster than they expected — and under the wrong guidance.


Three years later at Targul Fumos, von Manteuffel's *Gross Deutschland* Panzer Division was similarly surprised by Stalins. The German Tiger gunners were distressed to see their best 88mm projectiles bouncing off these new tanks' armor. The projectiles produced only sparks at ranges which should have given easy kills.

Yet, both divisions managed to turn technical defeat into tactical victories. They were highly trained and well-led units who knew that victories are not won just by firepower — but by maneuver, too. They used their heads, training and tactical flair to overcome a stunning, sudden discovery of enemy material superiority.

Americans are potentially the world's best troops — thanks to education and to individual thinking. We can do better. We can if we train — and that means knowing enemy men, materiel and methods, too.

Guderian, Germany's "Father of Panzers," told us that he was fully confident he could blitz the bigger, better-armed "great French Army" in jig time for two reasons. One was the setup and skill of his own forces — the other was a good knowledge of the enemy, his arms and his way of fighting.

US MC



ROTATE

By Maj Robert F. Steinkraus

☛ TAKE HEED! WE HAVE AN UN-healthy situation in Marine Aviation today.

There is something that can be done about it if we pool our resourceful talents and make a stand. The line company is bound to go along with us when they realize that the end result is a finer product which would give them better striking power. The antiquated individual rotation program might have at one time been the answer. However, just because we have become inured to its complexities we've stuck our head in the sand and resisted change.

Aviation units in the States have become nothing more than one huge training group. This applies in particular to the squadron, our main striking element. We are getting fresh new blood—the shot in the arm for which we have been thirsting these many long years— young, red hot tigers, fresh out of flight school.

But are we taking advantage of it? No! The famine has been long and we have become set in our ways.

These young fireballs are good. Much better trained than most of us who hit 'Canal with 200 hours under our belts and nothing much between the ears. They have been brought up on a jet blast whereas we are just getting used to the heat. Let's utilize them to the fullest extent.

What happens when they report for duty, either to a jet squadron or a heavy-hauling attack unit? Here's the situation that's driving squadron CO's frantic. That "old devil" replacement draft. It is the ever present monster causing the upheaval in our training methods with a resultant lack of combat readiness in our Stateside units.

Standards of training have become varied from command to command, and from squadron to squadron. The net product is a group of individual pilots, not a team. In today's age of high speed jet warfare, one pilot must depend on the other, for protection against hostile attack and for confirming close air support targets on the ground, even more than before.

The immutable cry that rings in the operation officer's ears is "Get the new boys trained!" They are the draft quota and must be ready to go in 4 months or 6 months, whatever the case may be. The heck with unit training as a whole—bore holes in the sky! This lad needs 6 more gunnery hops before Tuesday. That one has to have 10 more hours of night time. They are checking out Wednesday for Service Squadron. Month in and month out the story is the same.

The CO has just found out how the new pilot pronounces his last name and how he does his job. He hasn't met him socially nor found out how well he sings tenor in "On Top of Old PyongYang." Now the ever repeated juggle of departmental jobs begins again for the third time in a month. Perhaps the officer isn't a new second lieutenant. He might just as easily be a major or a captain who has recently come from staff duty. It makes little difference. Come and go—constant building up and tearing down. The panic button clangs frantically—pilots for the

THE SQUADRON


Individual rotation is *not* for the 'birds' — Marine aviation as a whole needs to shift into a system that will promote teamwork right down the line

draft get priority on flight time and the rest of the squadron can go hang. It's the nature of the system.

As a result, the final product arriving overseas leaves much to be desired from a command standpoint. In the forward area where teamwork should be at a peak, what do we have? Good pilots? Yes. They can bomb, rocket and strafe with the best of them, old or new. But on an individual basis—not as a team.

At a point where we should have our most effective air arm, what do we have? A final training phase. It is there and only there that a squadron has a chance of being moulded into a smooth fighting machine. The pilots and enlisted men remain with the unit for a length of time which makes it feasible. A squadron CO now has a chance to form a team.

But we still have a replacement system to contend with. Every month, so many pilots and so many men are due for rotation. Granted, they've been in the unit for a considerably longer time than is customary in the States. However, there





Teamwork becomes second nature . . .

remains the problem of integrating their replacements into the fighting machine.

Marine Aviation as a whole needs to shift into a system that will promote teamwork right down the line, not tear it down. The Marine concept of fighting is based on teams. We even use the command phrase, "air-ground team."

How can this best be achieved? Unit rotation is the answer! A master plan for deployment, involving every combat squadron in Marine Aviation.

It is a known fact that there are just so many combat aviation units available. Three other necessary ingredients which have a predictable value are: number of aviators, number of aviation ground officers and number of enlisted men. All of which are required in squadron organization in correct proportions.

Since the squadrons are already located geographically, the next thought is how, when and where will the rotation begin? For this command decision we shall use, for

want of a better term, phasing of the units through a training and deployment cycle. There will be three phases; formation, concentrated training and deployment.


In Phase I, the squadron is in the embryonic stage. A cadre has been assigned consisting of a nominal number of officers and men who have returned the squadron designation and files from overseas to its assigned station in the States. They inventory and take over the aircraft and gear from the rear echelon of the unit which has been deployed. In the case of re-equipment with new type aircraft, this is the time to do it.

The organization then begins to form from CO and Exec on down. The period required would depend on personnel available in a designated length of time. Very little actual training will be accomplished, but the squadron will be intact and the operating procedure will be building.

The squadron enters Phase II upon final build-up to fighting

strength. The number of aviators and enlisted men will be determined by the total number available. In this phase, all personnel are frozen on the job with transfers in and out of the organization on an emergency basis only. The unit does its heavy training during this period, let's say 6 months.

The nucleus of CO, Exec, Operations and special staff officers have been augmented by from 4 to 8 veteran pilots and a manning level of aviators sufficient to support predictable attrition. The molding of the fighting machine goes apace. Squadron doctrine is formulated on experience. Teamwork both on the ground and in the air becomes second nature. The CO knows his officers and men with more than just a nodding acquaintance. He knows them intimately. The same holds true down through the organizational structure to the junior man. The unit has an objective in



. . . in the air . . .

sight at all times — the deployment date for overseas — at which time they must be combat ready.

The team is brought to a peak of fighting efficiency. Each pilot knows what the other will do in any circumstance. No doubts as to anyone's ability to fly on the gauges or hit the target with whatever weapon may be chosen. The men are proud

However, there is no rule which says they will not fly combat missions. In fact, in the past it has been permitted and in some instances, required.

The big scream at this point has been the lack of personnel. Not so much in enlisted specialties, but among pilots and aviation ground officers. The NA situation is rapidly

maneuvers, would it not be better to have full air cover when requested, rather than a symbolic force of two or three aircraft when you requested two divisions? That's what you'd get with this system.

Shipping would be no greater problem than it is at the present. In fact, the numbers of personnel to be transported each month would not equal what is now being lifted. It would actually simplify the situation because every unit would be on a definite schedule. For years the Navy has been deploying their aviation units in this manner. There would be no ensuing crash program requiring a redistribution of hold space.

There have been many wails about launching an entirely fresh unit into an area with which they are not familiar. This has been proven incorrect in several instances. Squadrons which have done just that, the Blackpatch and Polkadot outfits to name two, had no trouble. At any rate, there is always the cadre from which the squadron was formed. In the case of Korea they will have been there before. Anyway, there are always other units on station who will lend a helping hand in the orientation of the area. In the case of deployment to a new and different location, nobody has been there before anyway. So what's the sweat?

Granted, the problems of execution are many, only a few have been set forth here. But look at the gratifying results.

The first and foremost is the placing of units in the field with better training and more effective striking power for our brothers on the ground. This is gained through a continuity of effort toward a single goal — combat readiness. As a result of this single goal, the squadron as a whole works as a team with every officer and every man knowing what the other will do in any circumstance. The individual, right down to the last buck private in the rear rank knows where he is headed and can plan accordingly. Officers and men will once again have pride in *their* outfit — the old esprit de corps of which we have so long been proud. This pride will, in turn, breed a greater pride in the Marine Corps as a whole. USMC

... and also on the ground

of their work and proud of the aviators who take to the air in the machines over which they have been sweating. The esprit will spring full blown.

Do the names Deathrattlers, Black-sheep or Checkerboard ring a bell, to name a few? You bet at least one of them does! They are outfits that formed as units, went into combat as units and came home as units. There isn't an officer or man who served in one of these squadrons while in combat that won't tell you it was the best damn fighting outfit there. And he would be right.

Therefore, Phase III is obvious: overseas to the forward area where the shooting is going on or liable to be at any time. The team is at its acme of efficiency and they are where they can do the most good.

What about staff, you say? Unfortunately there will have to be certain pilots who will be designated by name to fill the required billets where an aviator must hold down a desk. These would be people who have done one tour in combat.

being alleviated by the large influx of flight school graduates. Though we are still at a low ebb insofar as aviation ground officers are concerned, we have many secondary skills among the aviators which will take up the slack. It has been that way for years anyway. If there continues to be a shortage of pilots, we will have to accept the fact that Phase I will be an austere period of formation and concentrate on Phase II and resultant Phase III. It may even involve pulling in our horns on extracurricular commitments which do not have a direct bearing on the combat readiness of the Fleet Marine Forces' aviation. However, the results will be well worth the effort involved.

There would always be squadrons available in Phase II for participating in maneuvers on both coasts. What better training for an outfit that is just about to be deployed than operations akin to the type in which they will be employed in the forward area? And to the commanders on the ground: during





• DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION of Malaya in WWII, the only serious, organized resistance to the enemy was provided by the "Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army." The hard core of this guerrilla force was provided by members of the Malayan Communist Party, the majority and most influential members of which were Chinese.

When peace came, the Communists possessed a battle-tested organization and an enhanced reputation amongst the civilian population. In the main, they refused to surrender the arms and ammunition supplied to them by the British and, under the threat of proscription, went underground. They proclaimed the birth of the Malayan Races Liberation Army (the MRLA) and announced a program which included the overthrow of the government, with such of its instruments as the police, the expulsion of Europeans and the redistribution of wealth. In

ROYAL MARINES

ACTION IN



By Maj Anthony Crockett, RM



much of this there was a popular appeal to the "have-nots" and to those infected by the rising tide of nationalism, which crept over Asia in the wake of the departing Japanese.

The Japanese had treated Malaya badly, had exploited and bullied its population, drained and pilfered its resources and allowed the tin mines and rubber estates to go to ruin. While the British Military Administration governed and maintained order, the country gradually began to recover. Europeans—officials, business men, planters and miners—returned to their offices, estates and mines and started to rebuild. The police force, which had more or less disintegrated during the occupation, was slowly reorganized, although many new officers and men had to be recruited.

It was at this stage in the recovery of Malaya that the MRLA launched the first phase of its intensive campaign. The brunt fell on the police force. It grappled manfully with the task, but it was only too evident that it was not yet sufficiently large or well-trained to cope with a state of affairs which was rapidly deteriorating. With the declaration of a state of emergency and the introduction of more troops, the struggle between the communist organiza-

tion on the one hand, and the security forces on the other, started in earnest.

In the early stages the MRLA met with some success. Its tactics were based on fear—intimidation, terrorization, murder, arson, abduction, threats and blackmail. It aimed to win over the Asian population, especially the Chinese, who formed almost half the population of the Federation.

The Communist organization was split into three more or less independent bodies, which were yet closely interrelated; the armed and uniformed bandits, who were formed in military units and were the MRLA proper; the *Min Yuen*, who were its plain clothes workers, living in the towns and villages; and the *Lie Ton Ten*, or Killer Squads. These corresponded very much to the strong-arm thugs of gangsterdom who were charged with the "rubbing-out" of elements undesirable to the Communists and with minor operations such as the slashing of rubber trees, cutting of telephone wires and so on.

To keep their organization going and, in fact, to exist at all, the Communists needed money, food, arms and ammunition. The last two they already had in fair amounts since the end of the war and they had

added to them since by raids on police posts and from what they had been able to salvage from the dead bodies of armed men they had killed. For money and food they relied largely on what they could extort from the local population. This extortion they had worked out to a fine art. The Chinese have a saying, in which they liken themselves to the bamboo. When the storm comes, they say, the straight, tall tree stands proudly in his resistance to it and when he can resist no longer, he breaks. But the humble bamboo bends his head, bows before the storm—and survives.

The Communists made every small community responsible for supplying a quota of money from its weekly pay packets and each and every family was bound to provide food under arrangements laid down for them. This system of supply was greatly facilitated by the presence of a vast population of "squatters," nearly all of whom were Chinese. These Chinese, or their forebears, had entered Malaya, most of them illegally, and had settled down quite arbitrarily on a patch of ground where they had built a shack and then proceeded to cultivate the ground around it. Some of these people lived on the very fringes of the jungle, where their isolated

There is no black magic about operations in Malaya. Some of the problems of conventional warfare are minimized, some of the problems are aggravated,

but beneath it all lie the basic principles of courage and sound training



Wide World

To combat 4,000 terrorists, 35,000 troops were kept on the go

homes formed ideal staging posts for money and food destined for the bandits living in it. Others of them lived in squatter villages, which had grown in the course of time and which were far enough away from the main populated areas to make them only too accessible to the bandits.

In order to strangle this almost inexhaustible pipeline, a vast system of resettlement was undertaken by the civil authorities. All isolated squatters were concentrated into villages defended by barbed wire, protected by police posts and provided with such facilities as medical and welfare centers and schools. These measures not only protected the squatters from the easy depredations of the bandits, but afforded them such an extent of security that they began to lose some of their initial fear and passed information to the police.

It is necessary to know some of these facts about the origins of the present situation in Malaya, to understand the difference between the struggle taking place there and the more conventional forms of warfare. In May of last year, shortly before he retired as High Commissioner, General Sir Gerald Templar stated that there were some 4,000 active terrorists operating in the Federation. To combat their activities and those of a far larger body of ancillary supporters, it has been necessary to keep something in the nature of 35,000 troops active in Malaya for several years. This is surely an outstanding example of the efficacy of

guerrilla warfare.

Another point to bear in mind when studying the Malayan situation is: it is not (in legal terms) war but a "state of emergency." The "military" are in support of the Government and the police. While there are a number of emergency laws, and capital offenses now include such crimes as consorting with terrorists or possessing arms, civil and not martial law is administered in the courts by civil magistrates and judges.

In a country two-thirds of which is jungle, the speedy deployment of large bodies of troops is impossible.

In general, a battalion is responsible for an area, which is sub-divided into smaller company areas. The 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines was deployed in the State of Perak, in northern Malaya. My unit, 42 Commando, had its Headquarters in the town of Ipoh. (There are 5 Rifle Troops and 1 Support Troop in each Commando. Each Rifle Troop in Malaya, with attached drivers, signallers, cooks, medical personnel, etc., numbered about 70.) My Troop camp was some five miles away. It was based on a four-roomed bungalow, around which were grouped tents, wash-houses and latrines.

While remaining under the command of the CO, we were at the same time a self-contained outfit. My area comprised a long strip of flat country, two miles deep, containing tin mines, swamps, some small rubber estates and a large number of Chinese small-holdings. Beyond this it embraced a chain of high limestone outcrops and, on the far side of these, the jungle—stretching away through the mountains to the borders of Pahang.

The terrorists' military organization was much akin to ours, with a chain of responsibility for certain areas. Their bases were deep in the jungle. For food, clothing and medical supplies they relied upon the *Min Yuen*, whom they would




Trucks to the jungle, then "shanks' mare"

meet inside or near the jungle edge. Occasionally, large camps to accommodate as many as 60 men would be found. Generally they lived in groups of from 10 to 30, shifting their camps frequently. They were expert at living and operating in the jungle. Tough and hardy, they could move swiftly and silently over long distances, even when wounded, and were skillful in concealing their tracks. With a basic diet of rice and dried fish, and a way of living which needed only the bare necessities of life, their logistic problem was infinitesimal compared to that of British troops.

The uniformed MRLA carried out many forms of operation; ambushes on roads, raids on isolated police posts, the destruction of mine-machinery and smoke-houses, the murder of Europeans and/or of Asians who had failed to "co-operate" with or were suspected of informing on the bandits. These are but a few examples. They were all governed by the same principles — surprise, swift action, good planning, excellent intelligence and the avoidance of a direct clash with military forces.

The fundamental requirement for us — pitted against an enemy with a net, difficult to find and always on the move — was accurate and rapid information. With a civil popula-



Wide World

Back through the even-spaced rubber lies the jungle proper

Wide World



tion not actively hostile to the security forces but cowed into silence by fear, this was not easy to obtain. In this respect, we maintained the closest link with the police who, alone, were in a position to get this information. In Ipoh, a Joint Operations Room was set up in the police station, manned by our Intelligence Officer and a Police Operations Officer. Here was built up a picture of bandit movements and strength. Camps found and incidents reported often made it possible to gauge the tenor of terrorist activity and to anticipate their actions.

As I have said, sometimes these joint Headquarters were on a Commando/Battalion level. At other times, as for instance when my troop was operating more or less independently in Selangor State, in central Malaya, they were on troop level. This close cooperation be-

tween the military forces and the police was the secret of all successful operations. Furthermore, it was co-operation at all stages, from the sifting and integration of intelligence, through the planning, to the eventual execution. Like most forms of co-operation, it depended also on the personal relationships between ourselves and the police.

To understand how the system worked, let us follow a hypothetical case from its inception. The scene opens with the troop commander being called to the telephone.

"Captain Walker, Sir? IO here. The CO says you will come down to police headquarters as quickly as you can."

Tim Walker grabs his carbine, calls for his driver, and in his armored scout-car makes tracks for the Joint Operations Room. There he finds his commanding officer, the Officer Superintending the Police

Circle (OSPC), the IO and the Police Operations Officer. They are poring over maps and a large air-photograph mosaic pinned on the wall.

"Tim," says the CO, "we've just had an interesting bit of news about your area. The pumping engine at the Liu Chin Mook mine was destroyed last night and the engine house burnt down. The watchman reports about 20 armed bandits. He thinks they were all Chinese—some of them wearing red-starred caps."

The OSPC chips in, "Luckily he recognized one of them, a lad who used to live in his village, called Ah Kee. Now we know Ah Kee is in 6 Platoon of the 3d Company and that that platoon has been working for some time from up the Sungei (River) Tembo. We also know that this is the third attack on tin mines in that district in the last fortnight. We've been hearing rumors of late that some of the owners are getting fed-up with paying their 'contributions.' It looks as if the bandits are putting on the pressure."

"The police think there may be more of these attacks planned," the CO continues. "An informer has got hold of some yarn that the Li Han Chow is next on the list—they say old Li is a pretty stubborn character—and that the raid is going to take place in a couple of nights time. Our plan is roughly this. Soon after dark, two police squads will move into the rubber between the main road and the mine and will

watch likely routes. I want you to deal with any of the possible ways down to the mine from the jungle."

"As you know, Sir," says Tim, "half my troop is out at the moment and they won't be back for 4 or 5 days. They're right up in the jungle on the other side of my area. Even if I recalled them, I doubt if they'd be back in time. However, I've got enough men in camp to deal with this. I know that part of the country well. If the bandits are lying up in the upper stretches of the Sungei Tembo, they'll probably use one of two tracks down from there towards the mine. I'll ambush both of them with small parties. They'll have to move out today."

Tim and the OSPC then coordinate the details of their plans, mak-

ing quite sure that each knows where the other's men are going to be. This is vitally important in operations where it is often difficult to distinguish friend from foe and where the enemy, if encountered, is only visible for a few, fleeting seconds.

Back in his own camp, Tim briefs the ambush parties. A subaltern will command one and he will take the other. They will leave camp at 1500 hours and travel by truck, one to the west and the other to the east of the area, taking 48 hours' rations with them. They will de-bus in the rubber (the rubber tappers will have left for the day by then) and strike through it to the jungle, where they will have to reach the ambush positions by a circuitous route, camping



British Info



Always, there is an aura of damp and decay

After a rain—treacherous and slippery

for the night on the way.

At 1430 hours the ambush parties fall in for inspection. Each is about 12 strong, including a sergeant, a signaller, with his set on his back and an SBA (Sick Berth Attendant—a naval rating). They look a motley crew, in stained, shapeless shirts and slacks of olive green, their battered jungle hats worn with a rakish individuality. They carry the minimum of equipment—a small haversack containing their rations, washing and shaving gear, a change of clothing, sweater and an old pair of rubber sneakers—the last three for sleeping in. Below the haversack

is strapped a green poncho. On the front of the belt are two pouches for ammunition. On one hip is a water-bottle, on the other a machete. They are armed with light machine guns, carbines, rifles, HE and smoke grenades. A bandolier of ammunition is slung round the waist or a slatted satchel, filled with carbine or Sten magazines, is suspended from the belt.

The transport for the ambush parties is drawn up facing the camp gate. There is a 3-ton truck for each party, each escorted by an armored scout car. The men em-bus and the vehicles drive out, one pair turning to the right and the other to the left. We will follow the fortunes of Tim Walker, who with his party, is sitting in the 3-tonner which turned to the left.

The scout car and the truck speed along the main, tarmac road. The men sit facing outboard, their weapons at the ready and the tailboard down. There is always the possibility of an ambush to be borne in mind. Presently they reach a long stretch of road, lined on each side by rubber estates. It is away from all signs of habitation and there is no one in sight. Tim orders the driver to slow down, the men jump out, run quickly off the road and in amongst the trees. The truck and the scout car drive on.

They walk through the trees in extended line, their rubber-soled jungle boots making no noise. No one speaks—they have learned to move silently. Tim consults his compass from time to time. He has worked out beforehand the exact spot where the rubber ends—there he wants to enter the jungle. Presently the patrol senses they are reaching the limit of the rubber. Through the evenly spaced trees, they can see the tangled undergrowth which is the preliminary to the jungle proper. They have not met a soul since they left the road.

The bearing on which they have been advancing leads them to a narrow opening in the undergrowth. Shortly before they reach it, Tim halts the patrol and they form into single file, which is the only possible formation in which a body of men can move in the restricted space of the jungle. First goes the leading scout, armed with a machine carbine.

A few yards behind is another scout, similarly armed. Then comes Tim, with the Bren group immediately in rear and the remainder of the patrol strung out behind them.

In the rubber, they had been able to see in all directions for two or three hundred yards, but now the visibility is reduced to a yard or two. The light filters gloomily through the trees, almost as if they were under water, and throws deep patches of shadow about them. It is much cooler, but there is an aura of damp and decay and a sense of airlessness. The ground at their feet is seeping with moisture, spongy with the leaf-mold of centuries, packed with twisting roots. The trees soar upwards, branchless for a hundred feet or more, reaching for the sun. It is deathly quiet.

The track they are following leads up a spur and along the spine of a ridge. These tracks, made by game and the aborigines who live in the jungle, have existed perhaps for hundreds of years and provide the only means of making reasonable progress. They nearly always follow similar formations of ground.

The aids for jungle map-reading are few. Available maps are of a small scale and can show little more than the configuration of the land, the rivers and the larger streams. With these, a compass and the accumulated knowledge of the country obtained by his troop, a patrol leader has to be satisfied. It is seldom, if ever, possible to reach a point where he can fix his position in relation to another, owing to the confined visibility. In any case, landmarks hardly exist where dense jungle covers every feature.

The ground begins to rise sharply. It has rained during the afternoon, as it nearly always does, and the track, winding this way and that, is treacherous and slippery. Soon every man is soaked with sweat and is beginning to feel the weight of his equipment. They toil on until the track reaches the top of the spur and levels out along the ridge. There Tim Walker halts the patrol. They move off into the undergrowth and unfasten their equipment, while two of their number act as sentries, watching the track in either direction.

Tim takes out his map and fixes



British Info

Destroy all possible hideouts

his position as well as he can. From now on, he plans to move across the "grain" of the land in order to reach the ambush position unseen. This will entail moving where no tracks exist, up and down steep slopes and across rocky stream beds. It will undoubtedly entail cutting a way through thick undergrowth for a part of the trip. It will be gruelling work and progress will be very slow.

He looks at his watch. In two hours it will be getting dark and he must find somewhere to camp for the night, preferably near a stream, and in sufficient time for the patrol to build shelters and have a meal. They press on again, slithering down the flank of the ridge supporting themselves as best they can by gripping saplings and creepers as they pass. A vast brake of bamboo bars their way. Cutting a way through it would make far too much

noise and they have to work their way around it. Half an hour later Tim halts the patrol. They are almost in the bottom of the valley and, although he cannot see it, he knows water of some sort will be flowing nearby.

Camp is soon made. While the men construct 3-man bivouacs from branches and their ponchos, the signaller rigs an aerial ready for Tim to report back to base. Ration packs are opened. Tea is being brewed and tins of food are heated over Tommy cookers. Any minute now darkness will descend with tropical suddenness. The patrol stands-to until it is quite dark and then turn in. A pair of sentries are posted who squat, silently back-to-back. Should anyone approach their camp, which at night is unlikely, they want to be able to look upwards, if they are to have any chance of spotting a moving shape against the dark background of the jungle.

In spite of the fact that the sun has gone down, it is still very hot and, deep in amongst the trees, also very close. The outline of the sentries gradually merges into the pockets of blackness in the background as the night creeps down upon them. Soon the whole world is becalmed in silence.

Suddenly, about 20 yards away, there is a shrill whistle. An answering whistle sounds from the other side of the camp and is picked up by yet another from somewhere else. The sentries remain motionless.

This is a signal for the whole jungle to go crazy. As suddenly as the whistle starts, a thousand others burst in together. Every imaginable whistle, scream, rattle and wail is let loose on the night air, until the whole place sounds like a baseball game attended by a crowd of lunatics. For half an hour this tuneless din continues and then, as surprisingly as it started, it stops and the patrol is shrouded in deep, leaden silence.

As soon as it is light, they breakfast, dismantle the camp and hide all traces of occupation. The men have changed back into the sweat-sodden clothes of the day before, preserving their dry outfit for another possible night in the open. They cover the hundred yards to the

stream at the foot of the valley. Here, looking up at the gap in the trees over the water, they get a clear view of the sky for the first time since they left their truck.

A body of men crossing a jungle stream is always very vulnerable. Should they by ill luck have been located by bandits, this is just the spot where they would be likely to run into an ambush. Many of these streams are fast-flowing with hidden pools, their beds littered with boulders. The Bren gunner takes up a position where he can cover the crossing point and the men, one by one, wade slowly to the other bank. The Bren gunner crosses last, covered by one of the patrol who has already reached the far side.

All day they push on, sometimes cutting their way, pace by pace, gaining only a few yards in an hour, slithering down the steep slopes of valleys and toiling up the other side of them. About three o'clock Tim halts the patrol. He reckons they are near the summit of the ridge, along which runs the track he is going to ambush. Taking one Marine with him he goes forward, slowly and silently, lest he should be nearer to the track than he had estimated. When he finds it he stops and begins to search for a suitable ambush position. This takes some

time, as he dare not move on to the track in case he should leave signs of his presence imprinted on the soft mud. He sends back the Marine who is with him, with instructions that the patrol is to move another hundred yards down the hill and have a meal. He will join them as soon as his reconnaissance is finished.


They take up their positions some two hours before darkness. Tim has no idea how long they may have to maintain the ambush — perhaps 2 hours, 12 hours, 24 or 36 hours. Obviously, therefore, he cannot man it fully throughout this time. He divides the patrol into two watches, those off watch resting some 30 yards away, connected to the main position by a simple, string-operated signal.

The ambush lines one side of the track for about 12 yards. Here the path is straight but, just above it, in the direction from which the bandits might be expected it vanishes round a corner. Half an hour ago the sergeant crossed it lower down, where it narrows, and laid a line of booby-traps in the undergrowth a few yards in from the track and opposite the ambush position. Should the enemy walk into the trap and try to escape from the ambush party's fire, an unexpected

British Info



Resupply — difficult at best



Mandatory — native cooperation

reception will await them.

The men have concealed themselves in their individual positions and made certain that their fields of fire, restricted though they may be, are clear. There is nothing now for them to do save wait—and hope.

At this critical moment in the affairs of the ambush party, we will

leave Captain Walker and his small group of Marines. It might well have been that they were successful and that a silent-footed line of bandits, unaware of their danger, walked into the trap set for them. On the other hand—and far more akin to actual experience—they may well have waited, restless, uncom-

creased terrorist activity. It called for a high degree of physical fitness and stamina. In this respect it is interesting to note that the older men were inclined to stand up to the rigors of a prolonged patrol better than the younger lads.

High morale was essential. I have referred to the continual, nervous strain, which spared not even the most unimaginative and bore most heavily on the junior officers and NCOs. On operations, nerves were keyed to a constant intensity. In close country particularly, every yard of track, every overhanging bank or stream-crossing held a potential ambush. Round the next bend the leading scout might find himself face to face with a khaki-clad figure in a red-starred cap—the first to fire might well be the only one to survive. Patrols might return to camp after a week or several days away, looking forward to a day or two of rest and civilized comfort, only to be shot off again to cope with a sudden incident. Hours or days of waiting in mosquito-ridden ambush positions or on gruelling patrols would end in nothing, with an expected enemy who never came or one who had fled only a short time beforehand. These situations, aggravated by repetition, were met with patience, good-humour and, generally, by a considerable amount of colorful invective. The response to a sudden emergency or to a test of endurance was a keenness which never flagged.

I think this state of morale can be attributed to four main factors. Good leadership on the part of junior officers and NCOs; the intense interest taken by all ranks in the day-to-day struggle against the terrorists; an existence which gave no one the time or excuse to be bored; and, pleasant camps, with decent living conditions for the troops when they had the opportunity to enjoy such facilities.

As a training and testing ground for leaders, particularly junior leaders, Malaya could not have been bettered. Subalterns, sergeants and corporals had to take small bodies of men, sometimes for days on end, into country where they would be quite alone and cut off from all assistance. Contact with base was maintained by wireless, but with the



British Info

Ambush—restless and tensed



Enemy—where you find him

fortable and tensed, for another 24 or 36 hours and then, rations exhausted, have had to withdraw.

Such frustration, following on severe and prolonged physical effort, and at a sustained nervous tension, was typical of our work in Malaya. Constant patrolling of one's area, whether in the jungle or through the rubber estates and no-man's land between them, was essential. It kept the bandits guessing and on the move and, on isolated occasions, might lead to a surprise encounter or the discovery of a camp. Operations culminating in action, however, with enemy killed, wounded or captured, were not everyday events. For the most part it was slog, slog, slog with very few concrete results to show for it.

The work was hard and the men got little rest. Any slackening of effort in an area, or part of an area, was immediately reflected in in-

thick jungle, the mountainous and hilly nature of the terrain, the severe weather conditions of heavy rain and tropical storms, wireless was often a doubtful aid.

A high standard of skill and personal leadership was required of a patrol leader; skill in not losing his way, in adapting the jungle to his own ends, in his instant reactions to a sudden emergency; personal leadership in his own example of stamina, cheerfulness, courage and self-confidence. Some of this could be taught in the Jungle Training Center. The ability to live in the jungle, to master its difficulties and discomforts so that a man became confident in himself could be learnt, to a certain extent, by careful training. There was, however, all too little opportunity for sparing sufficient officers and NCOs for such training and most had to learn the hard way—by experience.

It was the same with the troops. By the time they reached their unit, they had been a month at sea. While they gradually became acclimatized during this period, they had hardly advanced their physical fitness. Their first two weeks were spent on short patrols or simple operations, which did not involve the covering of long distances or lengthy periods away from camp. They were also given as much instruction as possible on the "jungle" range. Most troops were able to construct one of these. A small area of broken, overgrown country would be selected. In it, hidden here and there, would be figure targets which would appear for a few seconds as the firer approached them. This called for a quick eye and instant reactions, both vital attributes in a warfare where contact with the enemy was, more often than not, unexpected and always fragmentary.

The care of his personal weapons, that basic lesson drummed into Marines on both sides of the Atlantic, was never more important than in Malaya. Rain, streams and sweat, any or all three, brought rust in their wake only too quickly. Mud, earth, broken twigs and leaves fouled barrels and moving parts. Men learned to watch the state of their weapons constantly, to overhaul them thoroughly each night and to check them on patrol at

every halt. A sudden meeting round a bend in the track—a bandit as surprised as you are—bringing his weapon forward to fire—and your carbine jams! It was a salutary thought, forgotten only by the foolish.

Jungle lore, the art of tracking, the ability to "read" the terrain and to "get the feel of it" are not learnt in a day. We had splendid trackers in our Ibans (Dyaks from North Borneo) who were skilled and courageous and accompanied us everywhere. By the time we left Malaya there were some men who could almost match them in these skills, and there were few who actively disliked the jungle.

The jungle, however, was not the only scene of our operations. It was the type of country, however, in which we spent most of our time and from which we probably won the least obvious results, although the time and energy spent there were of paramount importance. Many Commando Troops met with their greatest successes in the outskirts of squatter areas or in rubber estates. One of the more fortunate

British Info



A quick eye and instant reaction

ventures of my own troop occurred among some overgrown vegetable gardens a quarter of a mile away from the Ipoh Golf Course!

A fact which distinguishes operations in Malaya from more conventional forms of warfare, is their logistics. Once a patrol is committed to the jungle, it is, except for its wireless communications, cut off from the outside world. Each officer and man has to carry with him all that he and the patrol will need in the way of weapons, ammunition, food, clothing, wireless batteries and so on. Depending on the country to

be traversed (and it is seldom anything but difficult), this load is limited to three or, at the most, four days. Subsequent supplies, therefore, come by air.

At least 24 hours before the air drop takes place, the patrol leader signals his requirements back to base. His list is generally lengthy, a considerable portion of it being devoted to clothing. This takes a beating in jungle. Canvas, calf-length, rubber-soled, jungle boots wear quickly; sweat-soaked shirts and trousers tear easily on thorns and undergrowth; socks shrink to pygmy sizes. A drop zone has somehow to be found, enlarged or constructed. Sometimes a natural clearing can be used, or a patch of abandoned, aboriginal cultivation on a hillside utilized. These DZs are usually very small, insignificant holes in miles and miles of tree-tops. Yet, somehow, the pilots never failed to make their drop, with little to help them save a map reference (which is probably at least a mile off), a thin column of smoke spiraling upwards through the trees and a call-sign on the radio.

Of the helicopter I can say but little. When 3 Commando Brigade was in Malaya, there were no troop-carrying machines as there are today and only three S 51s, which were used for casualty evacuation—one of the worst problems of all in the jungle. The advent of the S 55 must obviously have done much to redress the balance of jungle warfare and at last our troops can hope to achieve both speed and surprise in terrain where formerly they seldom had either.

In conclusion, it should be stated quite clearly—as it was to all of us who went out to join 3 Commando Brigade—that there is no black magic about operations in Malaya. Some of the problems of conventional warfare are minimized—i.e., the enemy possesses no aircraft, tanks or artillery. Some of the problems are aggravated—the jungle has to be mastered and a guerrilla enemy found and brought to battle. Underlying everything, however, are the same principles, the same factors of morale and discipline and, most important of all, the spirit, tenacity, courage and sound training of the individual Marine. **USMC**

Let us recognize our *three* major amphibious capabilities



By Col William K. Jones

✿ THE EPIC "AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IN REVERSE" CONDUCTED AT HAMHUNG in December 1950, taught the amphibious forces many things of which perhaps the most important was that it could be done.

As Tarawa proved that a strongly fortified area could be successfully assaulted over the beaches, Hamhung proved that a sizable force could be successfully withdrawn tactically over the beaches. The lessons learned at Tarawa added impetus to the steady seeking for improved techniques in the amphibious assault that characterized World War II and continues unabated today. The lessons learned at Hamhung have likewise added impetus to the search for improved techniques in the amphibious field — but in the withdrawal rather than the assault. Herein lies the danger, for the tendency has grown to "marry" the amphibious withdrawal to the amphibious assault.

By allowing this trend to continue and grow, the opinion is shared by

many that we are both compromising our traditions and watering down our "Sunday punch." Of concern to all is any possible weakening of what we, in conjunction with other services, have managed to develop into one of our country's most potent strategic weapons—the amphibious assault.

Why is this so? Because the long years of study, research and experience in the Marine Corps have been devoted to developing procedures, techniques, weapons and equipment to ensure that once we launch an amphibious assault we not only get ashore—we stay there! Equally as important and the factor jeopardized by emphasizing the withdrawal, is the determination to stay ashore

Marine Corps and Navy the idea that if an amphibious assault becomes too tough we can always withdraw?

Picture a commander ordering "attack at 0600, seize, occupy and defend objective, prepare for further attack on order, but if you don't make it, let me know and you will be withdrawn behind that nice wide river to our rear." Ridiculous, isn't it? But in simple terms it is quite similar to the trend developing in our amphibious definitions. Needless to say, if such an attitude is allowed to develop, there will be no Tarawas or Iwos in the future even though one is required to win a campaign.

Certainly, in an actual operation,

bility of a new technique in amphibious warfare as we know it today. Let us then identify it and call it by its separate and distinct terminology—the amphibious withdrawal. By so doing, we take one step in the right direction to insure that we do not dilute the true meaning of the amphibious assault as developed through the imagination and efforts of generations of Marines and proven in two wars.

Let us next take one step further by identifying and developing the combination of certain elements of these two techniques at our disposal as a separate and distinct amphibious operation. Actually, any name would do to identify this combination, but for the purposes of this



The assault—to land and stay prepared for further operations

regardless of how great the odds or how black the outlook. In fact, the heart and soul of the real meaning of the term "amphibious assault" was and is this determination to land and stay—*come what may*. Equipment is planned accordingly, logistics are planned accordingly and, the tactics employed are not hampered or influenced by doubt in the ultimate success of the operation. On the other hand, if we take "the amphibious assault" and in our peace time rehearsals culminate the exercise with a tactical withdrawal across the beaches, will that not imply that we have not "come to stay?" Will that not implant in the minds of new and future generations of officers and enlisted personnel in the

any plan for a possible withdrawal would be made on the highest staff level and even the existence of such a plan would not be made known to subordinate elements prior to the time the need for such an operation arose; therefore, it is at this level that training should be conducted in making plans for such withdrawals in the form of staff exercises. In this way, the lessons learned at Hamhung can be fully and profitably utilized. In short, our capability to withdraw tactically across the beach should not be discarded; it simply should not be connected with the amphibious assault in training since by implication it will be so connected in an actual operation.

At Hamhung we proved the feasi-

article the term "amphibious incursion" will be used. It has been suggested as applicable and is used by some officers in reference to such a combination.

The term "amphibious incursion" as offered is intended to imply something more than a raid but less than an invasion. An amphibious operation that has infinitely more threat to the enemy than does a raid, but considerably less staying power by intent than does an amphibious assault. Before going into a more detailed description, the need for such an operation must be explained and justified. First of all, it should be realized that this is not a new technique as such. The only thing different is the use of modern tech-

The incursion—to land and cause a reaction on the part of the enemy



niques and weapons. No historical examples can be offered although military historians could probably produce a few. Furthermore, we have in effect been practicing generally what will be proposed.

In the event of a global war, it is obvious the free nations will first seek to delay and harass in order to gain time to fully mobilize their industrial and manpower resources. During this period we will not be ready to launch a counteroffensive. Although it is realized there are many who differ, there are also many who believe that during this period strategic bombing will harass and delay the enemy: this cannot be considered a counteroffensive. When the time comes for the counteroffensive, we will require strategic air, tactical air, naval task forces, amphibious assaults, field armies—i.e. invasion.

On the other hand, consider the strategic weapon we have available during this period in the form of amphibious incursions. Specifically, this type of amphibious operation would involve landing a force of combined arms to remain ashore for an indefinite period of time—of sufficient strength to cause a desired reaction by the enemy—with the capability of executing such further operations ashore as may be required to ensure the desired reaction—and culminating in an amphibious withdrawal.

The size of such a force would, of course, depend on the situation. However, it is visualized as not being less than a regimental combat team and Marine air group combination. More than likely it would be composed of a Marine division and air wing, and sometimes an air-ground task force of larger size.

The reaction desired of the enemy could be one or a combination of several. Without attempting to discuss an amphibious incursion in terms of a specific locale during a particular period of a global war, the type reactions we may seek can be grouped into general categories.

First, we may seek to delay and disrupt the enemy's "time table" of invasion and conquest. The many advantages of this are obvious, the most important being it gains us time to mobilize our manpower and resources.

Second, we may seek to disrupt his economy of forces. By allocating an important segment of his available reserve to guard against actual or, more important, possible amphibious incursions we restrict his ability to apply the principle of economy of force in attempting to achieve the principle of mass.

Third, we may seek to cause him to mass either because of terrain features that make him compress and channelize (such as mountain passes) or because of the concentration of force necessary for a success-

ful assault. Once he concentrates his forces, we can profitably employ our tactical atomic weapons. Conversely, in order to profitably employ our superior tactical atomic capability, we must out-manuever the enemy and force him to mass.

Regardless of the opinions of the overly zealous exponents of a quick and decisive victory (or defeat), the amphibious assault and the amphibious incursion share, and will continue to share top honors with other strategic means of waging war such as the atomic and hydrogen bombs. This opinion is based on the fact that the amphibious capability is the only strategic weapon we as a nation possess which, if employed, the enemy does not have the capability to retaliate in kind.


In summary then, let us recognize our three major amphibious capabilities—the assault, the incursion and the withdrawal. Let us recognize, develop and name each for its definite purpose; the *assault*, to land and stay prepared for further operations ashore as part of the strategic offensive; the *incursion*, to land and cause a desired reaction on the part of the enemy, then to withdraw and strike in some other locale as part of the strategic defensive; the *withdrawal*, as a valuable but little used means of extricating an over-extended or numerically outnumbered friendly force.

US 7 MC


The withdrawal—to get out an outnumbered or over-extended force



RUSSIA'S DRIVE



TO THE PACIFIC



By Col J. D. Hittle

COMMODORE MATTHEW PERRY, USN, who opened the long-shut doors of Japan, was more than an unusually able admiral, capable of carrying out delicate diplomatic policy. He was, unquestionably, a far-sighted strategic thinker possessing the all too rare ability to see events of his time in long-range historical perspective.

Perry, who participated in the bitter international competition of the Western Pacific when that area was developing at mid-19th Century, into a vast sea-power area, recognized the great geopolitical forces then taking shape. It was in a speech to the American Geographical Society in New York in March 1856 that Perry made his now famous forecast of events in Pacific Asia:

"It requires no sage to predict events as strongly foreshadowed to us all. . . It seems to me that the people of America will, in some form or other, extend their power until they have brought within their embrace the multitudes of islands of

the great Pacific . . . and I think, too, that eastward and southward will her great rival of future aggrandizement (Russia) stretch forth her power to the coast of China and Siam, and thus the Saxon and the Cossack will meet once more, in strife or in friendship, on another field."

Seldom has there been a more accurate prophecy of the course of international affairs. In terms of history, a century is but a tick of eternity's clock, but in not even quite a century since his speech, events have heavily underlined Perry's grasp of history and the accuracy of his vision.

By this point of the mid-20th Century, America, by purchase of Alaska, victory in the Spanish-American War and defeat of Japan has become the dominant sea-power of the Pacific Basin. Truly, America had brought within her embrace "the multitudes of islands of the Great Pacific," and most certainly, that much of Perry's prophecy has evolved

as he saw it at that time.

And, unfortunately for the interests of the free world, Perry's prophecy as to Russian power stretching out to the coasts of China had come true and extension southward to Siam is perilously close to reality. Today, a new contender has entered the Pacific sea-power area. World Communism, under the leadership of Soviet Russia, currently controls the Asiatic Pacific littoral from the Arctic to Indochina.

The strategic result is that the world is witnessing Russia, the world's greatest land power, emerge as a Pacific power of major consequence. Russia's rise as a sea power in the Western Pacific resulted, paradoxically, from the eastward extension of Russian land power to its geographical limit. The shore of the Pacific marked the eastern boundary of her land power and when Russia reached that water boundary, further eastward expansion would be largely in terms of maritime sea power.



Sovfoto

Yermak—conqueror of Siberia

It is from Vladivostok that Russian power in Pacific Asia has radiated, and it is this base that has served as Imperial and, later, Soviet Russia's main springboard for projecting influence throughout North-east Asia and much of the Pacific littoral. Russian establishment of that foothold on the Pacific marked the beginning of Russia's power in that vital area of the world and, by so doing, underlined the geopolitical vision of Commodore Matthew Perry who so accurately appraised the inexorable currents of history that were to bring the United States and Russia to the role of contenders for control of the Western, if not all of the Pacific Basin.

Vladivostok is the base for Russian power in Pacific Asia. Without such a base the history of Russian activity in the Far East would read much differently, and the problems of world strategy would be much different and probably much more simple.

Although Russian exploration and acquisition of the northern Pacific shores has had significant, strategic implications, the focal point of Russian Pacific power is Vladivostok in the southern part of Russia's Maritime Province. Possession of this Maritime Province between the Ussuri River and the sea—the area known as the trans-Ussuri region—flanking Manchuria from the sea

and stretching southward along the Sea of Japan almost to Korea, has been indispensable to the development of Russian power in the western Pacific area. Unquestionably, Russian acquisition of this territory on the Pacific littoral constituted one of the most important developments of modern history.

An understanding of how Russia obtained Vladivostok and the surrounding maritime provinces is essential background for any basic appraisal of Russian power in the Far East.

The story of the Russian march to the Pacific began in the reign of the able but cruel Tsar, Ivan the Terrible, in the latter half of the 16th Century. His was a Russia in transition. The yoke of Tartar domination had been thrown off less than a hundred years before; Moscow had not consolidated her position as successor to Kiev as the seat of power. Tartars in the south, Poland, Lithuania and the German Knights in the north threatened the existence of Muscovy itself.

To the East was the vast expanse of an apparently limitless frontier sparsely settled by native groups, an easy target for conquest and colonization. Actual conquest of the lands east of the Urals dates from 1580. However, Ivan, plagued by internal and external threats, had no time for carefully planned exploitation of his eastern frontier.

In a real sense, the conquest beyond the Urals was an accurate reflection of the hectic conditions of then contemporary Russia, for the

march to the Pacific was begun by a Cossack outlaw named Yermak. It was not the patriotic cause of carrying eastward the banner of Muscovy that induced Yermak to push beyond the Urals. Rather, it was because of his desire to escape Muscovy, for Yermak was under sentence of death if apprehended, for rebellion against the crown.

At the head of a small group of armed adventurers Yermak, in the fall of 1581, defeated the native prince Kuchum and claimed the vast trans-Ural territory, the "capital" of which was the town of Sibir—a significant term—for from it is derived Siberia, the name by which the entire area east of the Urals is known.

Yermak, a realist and opportunist, voluntarily presented his conquered territories to the Tsar who, in return, rewarded him with a pardon and gifts. Thus the authority of Moscow was carried beyond the Urals and the frontier was opened. The overland move to the East had begun and it was not to end until it reached the Pacific. Significantly, the colonization of Siberia and the drive to the Pacific was not initially the result of a deliberate governmental design, but rather the early flow of hardy peasants and adventurers migrating steadily toward a retreating frontier in an effort to improve their economic and political status.

Parenthetically, it is worth noting the historical similarities in the colonization of the American and Siberian frontiers. On both frontiers

Siberian colonists—hardy and persistent



Bettmann

colonization began in the latter 16th or early 17th Century. While the American and Siberian colonists certainly had different interpretations of freedom, each in their own way were seeking it. They were seeking material things too, for the magnet that drew adventurers further and further into the frontiers of both Siberia and America was the quick riches in the form of furs. Yet, there was another group which contributed later in the Tsarist regime to development of Siberia. These were the exiles who, usually for political offense, were forced to settle in Siberia. While their colonizing role was significant, they did not play as large a part in Siberian development as some popular accounts have indicated.

On each frontier, wilderness communications were facilitated by great rivers which served as the highways of exploration. Although most of the main Russian rivers empty into the Arctic seas, their tributaries and frequently portions of the main rivers flow in an easterly or westerly direction, thus providing convenient means for waterborne penetration of the frontier.

Also, in both instances possession of the frontier was obtained from native peoples by armed conquest: in America it was from the Indian tribes and in Siberia it was from the natives who were of largely Mongol stock. Not the least significant was the fact that the American and Siberian lines of colonization, (the American marching westward and the Siberian marching eastward) were converging on the Pacific. It was this fundamental feature that so impressed Perry. Thus, in both America and Russia the frontier drew both peoples toward the Pacific, and by so doing the retreating frontiers were shaping the present conflicts of interest. With good historical reason, it can be stated that the Russian colonization of Siberia and the exploitation of the American frontier were moving Anglo-Saxon and Russian peoples in accordance with their "manifest destinies" on collision courses.

Within six years after Yermak seized Sibir, Russian colonists had pushed beyond the Urals to establish the town of Tobolsk. The march continued and the shores of Lake



Yermak and Tsar Ivan—amnesty for half a continent Savtara

Baikal were reached in 1651.

Again, however, some of the land had to be wrested from the natives by force of arms, and it was only after three years of fighting (1655-1658) that the tough Buriat mongols of the Baikal region were conquered. As if impatient to reach the Pacific, the bolder colonists and adventurers refused to wait for the pacification of the Buriats and pressed on in the trans-Baikal region between the lake and the Manchuria frontier. As the Cossack spearhead of the Russian drive to the east moved deeper into this trans-Baikal area it reached the region of two rivers, the Amur and the Ussuri. These waterways were destined to play an increasingly important role in Russian military and diplomatic effort to establish a firm foothold in eastern Asia.

By mid-17th Century the Cossacks under Khabanov had sailed down the Amur, plundering the natives and exacting tribute as they went. At about the same time a Russian fort was established on the Amur, thus signifying in eastern Asia what other peoples in other places were to learn about the Russians—that conquest by Muscovy was not a transitory raid, but eventual occupation and accession.

Having reached the valleys of the Ussuri and the Amur, the Russian expansion to the sea met with an unexpected and formidable obstacle.

What had happened was that the Russians, who moved so swiftly through the scattered native tribes east of the Urals and in the Baikal region had, by reaching the Amur and Ussuri, pushed their expansion

to the northern borders of the Chinese empire. No longer were the Cossack adventurers dealing with relatively ineffective tribesmen. Instead, they were confronted by one of the oldest and most powerful nations of the world. It was an unfortunate time for the Russians to challenge Chinese power, for China of the latter 17th and early 18th Century was a China under the rule of the great K'ang Hsi, second emperor of the then new Manchu Dynasty, and one of the most able statesmen ever produced by the oriental world. This vigorous and wise ruler was not slow in reacting to the Russian pressure against his tributary peoples to the north.

Russia's armed occupation of the Amur-Ussuri region was accompanied by diplomatic overtures by the Russians toward the Imperial court in Peking. Each of these early missions failed because the Russians did not offer tribute, a required ritual in initiating diplomatic relations with China, which had long ruled as the Middle Kingdom of the oriental world. The historian Aaston Cohen relates, however, that one Russian mission to Peking did return with a letter from the Court, but the letter "was of no use to anybody for nobody in Moscow could read it."


K'ang Hsi was not one to be intimidated by the appearance of the Russian soldiers and colonists on his northern borders. Nor, on the other hand, were the Russians, after pushing the frontier all the way from the Urals, in any mood to turn back toward the Urals because their



Beltmann

Post station — couriers constantly kept the Kremlin informed

Right — outposts of empire forged the links of conquest



Sovfoto

presence was offensive to the Chinese Emperor.

As a result, there began an undeclared but bitter border war, although neither the Russians nor the Chinese wanted war. Russia sought commerce and territory north of Manchuria; K'ang Hsi's primary objective was the stabilization of his northern borders and the protection of his tributary tribes in that area threatened by Russian expansion.

In 1685 K'ang Hsi initiated negotiations with Moscow for a settlement of that Chinese-Russian conflict in the Far East. The Tsar indicated a conciliatory attitude by designating Theodore Golovin as his ambassador for the negotiations with China. Four years later, in the summer of 1689, Chinese and Russian representatives met at Nerchinsk, east of Lake Baikal.

The negotiations were conducted under conditions which emphasized that in the orient, as elsewhere, diplomatic and military strength are not unrelated. It is recorded that the Russian proposals were supported by the presence of 1,000 soldiers. K'ang Hsi demonstrated his faith in the value of diplomacy backed by force by supporting his representatives with a fleet of river boats, artillery and 10,000 troops.

Apparently the Russian envoy got the point. The Treaty of Nerchinsk

(1689) was the first treaty between China and a European power. It was also a diplomatic victory for China. Under the terms of that historic treaty—and in respect for K'ang Hsi's 10,000 troops at Nerchinsk—the Russians agreed to withdraw from the entire valley of the Amur.

Thus China was freed from the threat of Russian pressure on the northern borders of Manchuria and Russia was halted in her drive to establish a base of power in the Amur-Ussuri region of northeast Asia. Even the fort of Albazin on the upper Amur was razed in accordance with Chinese demands.

One aspect of the Nerchinsk treaty is of immediate interest in view of the recent and prolonged Korean negotiations over the issue of prisoners of war. It will be recalled that the Communists negotiators in Korea demanded the repatriation of all prisoners, regardless of their personal desires and irrespective of whether they were captured by force or surrendered willingly.

At Nerchinsk the Russian and Chinese negotiators agreed on the repatriation of "deserters" from their respective forces along the border. Thus, at the end of the 17th Century, Chinese-Russian negotiations demonstrated a line of thought with respect to repatriation of enemy held

nationals which was to constitute a fundamental issue in the Korean negotiations over two-and-a-half centuries later. Again, we have an eloquent example of how the lessons of oriental history have direct application in present day Far Eastern affairs.

In essence, the Nerchinsk treaty expelled Russia from the Amur-Ussuri region. By so doing, the Manchu Emperor K'ang Hsi relieved the pressure on his northern Manchurian border and he blocked, for almost a century and a half, Russian access to the strategic maritime province. However, the Russian tide of eastward expansion was running too fast and too strongly to be dammed completely by the reversal at Nerchinsk. Deprived of the Amur-Ussuri region, Russian expansion was deflected northward into the Northeast Kamchatka region of northeast Siberia. Eventually, Russian expansion jumped the Bering Straits and moved into the American shores of the northern Pacific. All of which serves to illustrate the almost irresistible momentum with which Russia of the 18th and early 19th Century pressed eastward into the Pacific littoral.

However, such expansion in the north did not make Russia forgetful of the more hospitable climate and terrain of the Amur-Ussuri

region. An unfaltering memory has been an historic characteristic of Russian — Tsarist or Soviet — imperialism. An objective once sought was never forgotten. Russia's patience was equalled only by her determination to seize the first opportunity to take that which had been denied at Nerchinsk.

Sensing that such an opportunity was soon to arise in the Far East, the Russian government in 1828 revived its interest in the Amur region by ordering a survey of the entire area. As the middle of the 19th Century approached, four factors combined, as if in a giant conspiracy of circumstance, to bring Russia once again to the northern borders of Manchuria and the Amur route to the sea. The first and perhaps the most basic of these factors was that the deterioration, which inevitably overtook all Chinese dynasties, had begun to manifest itself in the Manchu court. Next, unfortunately for China, deterioration of the Manchu dynasty coincided with the entry of the great western maritime nations into competition for the Chinese trade, accompanied by demands for extraterritorial concessions which China was incapable of resisting.

Then, China, by her failure to colonize the Amur-Ussuri region, made the area a tempting target for colonization. Such failure to exploit and consolidate the diplomatic victory at Nerchinsk, created in a sense, a power vacuum in the Amur-Ussuri region. Russia, whether Tsarist or Soviet, has demonstrated an historical eagerness to fill such

vacuums. This was to prove no exception.

Further, in 1847 the Tsar designated a Nicholas Muraviev to be governor-general of the vast area known as Eastern Siberia. For that reason the year 1847 was destined to be an historic one in the long story of Russian imperialism. Muraviev was a man of great determination and astuteness, and like some other successful agents of imperialism in the Far East, he was apparently not hampered by an overdose of scruples.

Muraviev clearly envisioned the geopolitical significance of Russian possession of the strategic trans-Ussuri region on the Pacific. Control of that area would outflank Manchuria on the sea and would inevitably serve to project Russian power southward toward Korea and China proper.

Fortunately for Muraviev, Russian colonization in northeast Siberia had not stopped with the rebuff of Tsarist expansionism at Nerchinsk. Although blocked in the more desirable Amur-Ussuri region, development of Eastern Siberia had been continued by exploration and active colonization in the north. The Kamchatka peninsula was occupied in 1707 and the bleak Kolyma region opposite Alaska was colonized by 1742. The Pacific littoral had a magnetic attraction for Russian imperialism and in 1732 the Russian explorers Fedorov and Avozdev reached Alaska. Nine years later Captains Behring and Chinikov were sailing along what is southern Alaska. The Russian-American Company, under Baronov, had estab-

lished Russian authority in Alaska, and by 1812 he had a Russian colony in California. It is indeed worth noting how vigorously Russian imperialism moved out of northeast Manchuria to North America and continued southward along America's Pacific littoral. Baronov, who was dedicated to his dream of making the Pacific a Russian lake, died in 1818. Had he lived a few years more it is highly possible that Russian expansion on the west coast of the American continent would have assumed a size and degree of permanency that could not have failed to create a fundamental Russian-United States conflict of interests in the 19th Century.

Such Russian expansion around the northern rim of the Pacific indicated how Russia, in the 18th Century, as a result of the Treaty of Nerchinsk, by-passed her main objective, the trans-Ussuri region which she wanted for her base of power in the western Pacific. It was by-passed, but not forgotten, for it always loomed large in her imperialistic designs. Thus, when the deteriorating power of the Manchu dynasty in the mid-19th Century offered the opportunity for Russia to make another bid for the trans-Ussuri coastal region, Muraviev's position was strengthened by the colonization of the Siberian frontier and settlement of the northeast Asian and northwest American coastal area. All of these developments had the effect, in a geographical sense, of flanking the trans-Ussuri objective.

Muraviev moved rapidly in tightening the encirclement of his objective area. In 1848 he made a test violation of the Treaty of Nerchinsk by sailing a Russian force down the Amur. This brought forth no strong Chinese protest. In 1850 he established, again in violation of the Treaty, the city of Nikolaievsk at the mouth of the Amur. Russia had a firm foothold on the northern flank of the vital coastal area between the Ussuri and the sea.

In 1854 the Tsar conferred on Muraviev what amounted to plenary authority to negotiate the boundary problem with China and was free to consummate his plan for acquiring the trans-Ussuri region as the bastion of Russian power on the Pacific.

China was progressively weakened

Vladivostok — Muraviev founded the Russian hub of the Pacific

Sovfoto



by foreign intervention and domestic unrest. This was the moment he had hoped for, and in 1858, as China fought the T'ai-pings in civil war and the British and French in the "Arrow War" (over trade, diplomatic representation, and extraterritorial rights) Muraviev succeeded in bringing Chinese envoys to a boundary conference at Aigun, on the upper Amur.

At Aigun there was a reversal of the Chinese and Russian positions at Nerchinsk over a century and a half before. At the time of the Aigun negotiations, China had no forces to spare for a border war with Russia. Muraviev had a small but superior force as well as a growing base of power resulting from Siberian colonization. Power was on the Russian side and the Treaty of Aigun was a Russian diplomatic victory. Again, an example of the influence of power in oriental diplomacy.

The Aigun Treaty was a salient, although not complete, victory for Muraviev. He did gain Russian possession of all the northern (left) bank of the Amur, the area from which the Russians were excluded at Nerchinsk. This Chinese concession to Russian imperialism established the northern Manchurian-Siberian border essentially as it has remained to the present time.

The agreement on the settlement of the trans-Ussuri issue is of more than academic interest, for it was based on a compromise, the pattern of which has become virtually the hallmark of Soviet expansion in the present age. China refused to cede the trans-Ussuri and Muraviev would not withdraw his demand that it be transferred to Russia. Muraviev then resorted to the device of joint control of the region and this was finally accepted as the basis of settlement.

This was satisfactory to Muraviev, for he knew that joint control of the area would eventually mean Russian control. Apparently the Manchu Court at Peking sensed the same outcome and the Emperor re-

nounced that portion of the Treaty.

Such Chinese reaction had no effect on Muraviev. By the terms at Aigun he had gained Russian entry into the trans-Ussuri and he had no intention of withdrawing as long as he had the stronger military forces in the area.

While Muraviev was vigorously pushing his occupation of the disputed area, a determined effort to obtain treaty sanction for Muraviev's "invasion" was being made in Peking. On this the Manchus were still adamant, curtly informing Gen Ignatiev, Muraviev's partner in imperialism, that even the joint control provision of the Aigun Treaty was null and void.

But the Manchus were still in the unfortunate position of not being able to back their diplomacy with force. In 1860 T'ai-ping rebel armies were devastating vast areas of China proper, the joint British-French forces had occupied Peking, burning the Summer Palace as punishment for the deaths of 20 European captives of the Chinese. Chinese resistance collapsed and the Manchu emperor fled to the mountains of Jehol, on a face-saving "hunting trip," leaving his brother Prince Kung to settle with the French and English.

Such a confused and troubled situation was just what the Russian representative, Gen Ignatiev, wanted and he moved rapidly, and with no small degree of astuteness. Accordingly, when he made his move, he did so with at least superficial subtlety, demonstrating an awareness of the oriental emphasis on saving face. His approach to Prince Kung was simply this: China was being invaded by the powerful British and French forces; the Summer Palace had been burned; Peking was faced with destruction; as a Russian, and hence a friend of China, he would intervene to save Peking from the French and British. In return for this friendship, Russia "only" wanted the trans-Ussuri region.

Prince Kung saw the true inwardness of the proposal, but he was powerless to reject it. Thus the Manchus, in 1860, learned as did Sun Yat-Sen a half century later, the high cost of Russian "friendship."


So, in November of 1860 Ignatiev and Prince Kung signed the agreement by which the trans-Ussuri region was ceded outright to Russia, thus obtaining treaty title to what Muraviev had actually, if illegally, already made a part of Russia. However, the legal affirmation of such Russian imperialism was a highly desirable achievement, for it strengthened Russian claim to a vital region at a time of intense European competition for Asiatic possessions.

The results for Russia and the modern world have been indeed significant. The Russian frontier had reached the sea and Manchuria was cut off from it. Russian territory now reached to almost the northern boundary of Korea. Russia, via the land route, had emerged as a power on the Pacific possessing a strategic coastal lodgment to serve as the base for her struggle against the maritime powers for control of Asia.

In the southern part of the newly acquired trans-Ussuri region — now known as the Maritime Province — Muraviev founded the city that was to be the hub of Tsarist, and later Soviet, power on the Pacific. The founding signalled the culmination of an era of expansion, colonization and imperialism begun by Yermak the Cossack who crossed the Urals 200 years before. It also marked the opening of a new era of increased Russian competition in the Pacific Basin, an era of east-west Pacific conflict so accurately forecast by Commodore Perry.

In view of the events of Far Eastern history, since Muraviev founded that city, it would appear that the name given it was less a geographical designation than an indication of the role its imperialist founders intended it would play. That city was Vladivostok — "domination of the Pacific."

US & MC





ONR

RESEARCH IS A SLOW PROCESS from which few revolutionary ideas emerge overnight. It is a painstaking job, often tedious and unrewarding. But it is vital, for from the laboratories, the drawing boards and the planning tables of today come the ideas which, when accepted, expanded and tested, help to assure a strong and vibrant armed force for tomorrow.

At the Office of Naval Research in Washington, many of the new ideas take form and are considered, then are discarded or passed on to such development activities as the Marine Corps Equipment Board, Marine Corps Development Center, Joint Landing Force Board and the Research and Development Section of Headquarters Marine Corps.

There are five branches in the Naval Sciences Division of ONR: air, armament, undersea warfare, program analysis and amphibious. Because of its importance to the Marine Corps, we shall concern ourselves primarily with the latter. It is there that many of the ideas and techniques and much of the equipment which may be "old stuff" to Leathernecks of the 1970s will first be discussed and considered.

The Amphibious Branch is staffed by Marine and Navy officers and a civilian mechanical-aeronautical engineer, with a Marine colonel authorized as branch head. Also, Army and Coast Guard officers assigned as liaison men to the Office of Naval Research within the Amphibious Branch.

Simply stated, the mission of the branch is to ferret out or receive and evaluate new ideas, techniques, equipment and by contract with universities, research organizations, scientific institutions or private individuals, investigate them for their possible application to amphibious warfare.

Let us look, for example, at the

field of amphibious oceanography, the title applied to the surf zone of a shoreline, the critical area of any amphibious operation conducted by the conventional "over the water" method. Considerable research has been conducted by the Amphibious Branch in this field, with the goal to amass as much knowledge as possible on the effect of oceanographic features such as breakers, waves, surf tides and swells on landing craft and amphibious vehicular craft. When the information is compiled, it may be presented in manual form for the use of staff officers engaged in training and planning for amphibious operations.

Among the other research projects sponsored by the Amphibious Branch are studies and investigations of a new type of assault air transport vehicle of convertiplane form; improved weapons and ammunition for amphibian vehicular craft; new techniques and equipment for underwater demolition teams and amphibious reconnaissance units; trafficability studies of beach areas and the determination of trafficability, as well as other terrain conditions, by aerial photographic interpretation of land forms, soils and vegetations.

Studies of amphibious landing craft, body armor and improved techniques for collection, dissemination and presentation of intelligence information for amphibious operations are also in progress.

When the Amphibious Branch was established several years ago, it showed that the Office of Naval Research recognized that research was as important in the field of amphib-

By LtCol C. R. Schwenke

ious warfare as for air, undersea or any other type of warfare. Because it was desired that both naval force and landing force interests be covered effectively, Marine officers were requested and assigned key duties within the organization, as has been previously mentioned.

For its part, the Marine Corps has consistently provided a high degree of co-operation and assistance in the amphibious research program of ONR. In addition to permanent personnel and equipment provided, Marine liaison officers have been assigned, on an additional duty basis, to impart tactical or operational knowledge to the scientific and engineering personnel actually prosecuting the research. This has expedited some projects by permitting operational personnel to work with the technical men.

Despite the efforts of ONR and other service activities engaged in warfare research, the tangible results of such research are usually slow in realization. For amphibious warfare, the tried and proven techniques and equipment which were developed and employed so effectively in the past will be continued for the present with slight modifications. But it is distinctly possible that new and improved tools will result from the large-scale research and development program now underway. In the future, we may have to adapt our techniques to best utilize these new tools, many of which will have been born in the conference rooms of the Amphibious Branch of ONR. USMC

In Part I, the author covered the essential history and background of French colonial expansion in Indochina and revealed how the Japanese occupation during WW II ripened the harvest of a revolt, the seeds of which were sown some 50 years before.

✱ DURING THE WAR YEARS A POLITICAL "front" had been building covertly in Vietnam, particularly in Tonkin; and among Vietnamese in exile across the border in South China. The leader of this political and military effort was Ho Chi

Minh. Born Nguyen Ai Quoc in Annam in 1892, he went to sea on the eve of the First World War. Somewhere during the course of the next five years he acquired the idea of leading a movement for the independence of his native land. Impressed by the doctrines of Woodrow Wilson regarding the self-determination of peoples, he appeared at the Conference of Versailles in 1919 to voice a plea for the independence of Vietnam. Thereafter, he engaged in political activity in France, first with the Socialists, then with the Communist party. In 1923 he went to Moscow and stayed to study revolutionary technique for the ensuing two years. In 1925 he proceeded to Canton, China and served for the next two years as a translator on the staff of Borodin, the Soviet advisor of the Chinese revolutionary leader Sun Yat Sen. After Chiang Kai Shek broke with the Communists in 1927, Ho Chi Minh betook himself again to Russia. During the next 14 years he engaged in Communist activities directed toward obtaining freedom for Vietnam. He did not risk him-

self in Indochina but operated from vantage points outside such as Thailand and Hong Kong. He appeared in the South China province of Kwangsi in 1941 at a conference of Vietnamese political leaders. There he was instrumental in setting up a united front organization called the League for the Independence of Vietnam (Vietnam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi shortened to Viet Minh) and was named the General Secretary of the organization. Throughout the war years, the Viet Minh devoted itself to organizing resistance within Indochina to both the Japanese and the French. The Viet Minh also organized a military force of about 10,000 Vietnamese in China with the assistance of the Chinese and the American OSS. This force was destined to play a much larger part than the harassment of Japanese forces in Indochina, the mission for which it was initially organized.

The Potsdam Agreement had provided that the British would undertake disarming the Japanese in the southern half of Indochina to the 16th parallel, and that Chinese

A series of victories over the Viet Minh would have restored French 'Face' in Indochina. But those victories never came



INDOCHINA


forces would undertake the same mission in the northern half of the area. However, on 15 August, 1945 there were neither British nor Chinese troops immediately available. Ho Chi Minh saw this interregnum as his golden opportunity and seized upon it accordingly. Some months previously he had established his headquarters at Thai Nguyen. Immediately on the announcement of the Japanese surrender, Ho proceeded posthaste to Hanoi with his Viet Minh Army led, then as now, by Vo Nguyen Giap. Fortunately for the Viet Minh, the Japanese did not resist their assumption of authority. Thus, on 22 August, Ho was able to proclaim the establishment of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" and assume power with a provisional government that was supposed to include Cochin China in its scope. Emperor Bao Dai did not resist this turn of events and ceremoniously abdicated on 26 August. He was thereafter appointed a political advisor of the provisional government.

While the Viet Minh sent agents

All photos from
SERVICE PRESSE INFO

By Col J. F. McQuillen

HINA





Roads were few and far between

forthwith to Cochin China, they had not had time to consolidate their administration when General Gracey and his British forces appeared on the scene on 12-13 September. General Gracey refused to deal with representatives of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" (DVR). Instead, he assisted in the rearming of the Japanese-interred French forces and co-operated in the restoration of French control in his area of occupation, including Cambodia. By the end of January 1946, General Gracey had accomplished his mission of disarming the Japanese and evacuating Allied prisoners. He had exceeded it by assisting in the restoration of French rule. He then withdrew from the scene with the bulk of his forces.

Unhappily for the French, the Chinese in the North were not to prove so cooperative as the British. Following their arrival in mid-September, they cooperated instead with the provisional government already established by the Viet Minh. In an effort to broaden the base of this government they did force it to take in additional Chinese-oriented parties and caused the Indochinese Communist Party to dissolve into a Marxist study group. But the Chinese obstructed French attempts to reinstitute French control. They refused to permit French troops or officials to return to the North until they had concluded a treaty that would settle a number of outstanding issues between China and France and give Chinese goods the right of transit from Haiphong to Yunnan. This treaty was signed on 28 February 1946, but still the Chinese proved reluctant to leave. Mean-



Supply trains were a fruitful target

while their forces looted widely and promiscuously.

Finding themselves confronted north of the 16th parallel by an established indigenous government possessed of an Army of its own, and a considerable talent for administration, the French officials decided to deal with that government. On 6 March 1946, they signed with Ho Chi Minh an agreement by which France recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as "a free state with its own government, parliament, army and finances, forming part of the Indochinese Federation and the French Union." Whether Cochin China was to become a part of this Vietnam was to be determined by a referendum. The agreement also permitted the return of French troops to the North. These were to be withdrawn in increments until 1952, by which time the only French forces remaining in Vietnam would be those guarding military bases!

Thereafter, French-Viet Minh negotiations took place intermittently at Salat, Indochina and Fontainebleau, France over the next several months. In September, an 11-point "modus vivendi" was reached that defined the status of French citizens and French property, currency, a

customs union etc. However, there was bad faith on both sides and this modus vivendi was never put into effect.

The author had occasion to visit Saigon twice during the month of November 1946. A certain unease was manifest, and the American Consul General confirmed the existence of a state of tension between the French and the Vietnamese. Between these visits, Dr. Thinh, the

French-appointed Governor of Cochin China committed suicide, apparently as the result of despair born of frustration. Admiral D'Argenlieu, the High Commissioner, during the course of a call at his Headquarters, attributed the tension to the demands of the Viet Minh for the promised referendum in Indochina. In late November, the French seized the Customs House and certain other areas in Haiphong with armed force, supported by naval gunfire. Three weeks later, on the night of 19 December, the Viet Minh rose in


Few of the stream



the night against all of the French, civil and military, within their reach in Vietnam. As a result of this night of terror, some 140 French civilians, including women and children, were murdered and 200 others were carried off as hostages of the Viet Minh. As a further result, open warfare was initiated between the French and the Viet Minh that has carried to the recent cease-fire agreed on 20 July 1954.

Ho Chi Minh and his government fled to the hills of North Tonkin and re-established themselves as the governing force over those areas of Tonkin and Annam not under French military control. The troops of Vo Nguyen Giap also were able, in larger measure, to avoid the French counter-action that followed on the Viet Minh attack. However, at that time the Viet Minh Army was not a very effective fighting force. Its arms were a miscellaneous collection of weapons of Japanese, French, Chinese and American origin. It was deficient in automatic weapons, mortars and explosives and had almost no artillery. Now that they were back in the saddle in the major cities of Indochina, the French military were content to pursue the Viet Minh forces to the foothills and there break off pursuit in the expectation that the enemy would disintegrate under the influence of the hardships, disease and shortage of supplies that must be their lot.

But instead of disintegrating, the Viet Minh forces gradually gained in strength, cohesion, discipline and effectiveness under the hardships imposed by their circumstances. In the



Outposts were lonely and isolated

years 1947 through 1949 they did not receive any appreciable amount of aid from outside sources. They were unable to challenge the French in pitched battle, hence relied on guerrilla warfare to effect attrition on the French forces. Their tactics were not unlike those employed by the American Indian during our own Indian Wars. Small French outposts were often subjected to surprise attacks and occasionally overwhelmed. Forces enroute to the rescue would be ambushed at a critical point in the highway. A home-made land mine exploded under the leading truck of the convoy generally gave the first intimation of the ambush. A French liaison plane overhead would note the ambush and signal for reinforcements. Meanwhile, at the ambushed convoy, the Viet Minh would melt away at the approach of reinforcements. Perhaps by that time they would already have succeeded in killing the personnel of the convoy and looting the trucks. More often, they would be driven off from a rescue convoy by the personnel thus ambushed, but not until appreciable French losses had been sustained.

It was the necessary supply convoys that provided the most fruitful target for Viet Minh ambushes. These ambushes more often resulted in minor victories for the Viet Minh, and also provided a measure of badly needed military supplies. Thus did the war continue through the campaign seasons (the dry months of the northeast monsoon from September to May) of 1947-1950. The Viet Minh were unable to stand against the French anywhere, but were able to harass them with guerrilla war-

fare everywhere. Without the sympathy and active assistance of the peasants behind the French lines in the Tonkin Delta, the Viet Minh forces could not have long survived. Not only did a large proportion of these peasants provide contributions of rice for the Viet Minh (VM) Army, but they also sheltered the VM guerrillas in their villages when the occasion required and gave continuing information on all French movements. A French patrol could never be sure that the groups of sulen peasants seen wading in the rice paddies, or collected at the market place in the village, were not guerrillas who would collect their hidden arms in the night and attack a selected outpost in accordance with a well-laid plan.

In addition to deriving an advantage from support accorded by the peasants, the VM forces also derived an advantage from their superior ability to utilize the terrain to advantage. Because of their bulky impediments and the general inability of their troops to move long distances on foot in that tropical climate, the French forces were road-bound by day and out-post bound by night. It has been mentioned that in the deltas the terrain is flat and water-logged, with few roads but numerous footpaths. The lightly armed VM forces were able to move freely on the footpaths at any time and along the roads at night.

In recognition of the superior abilities of the VM troops in night operations, the French forces generally stuck close to their garrisoned outposts at night. In view of this fluidity of movement of the VM, it

ere adequately bridged



was only on rare occasions that the French were able to fix and destroy any sizable groups of VM soldiers. Nor was this advantage in tactical fluidity of movement of the VM forces confined to the delta areas. In the hills and mountains the situation was much the same. While the French enjoyed a great advantage in the longer moves because of their air transport capability, the VM still had the advantage along the few roads and footpaths between airfields. And the jungle growth that covers all uncultivated terrain provided the VM with excellent protection from French aircraft.

By 1949 the Viet Minh Army had grown from the original 10,000 to 70,000 men. These were organized into units of regimental size and designation, but were normally deployed for operations in units of battalion or company strength. In addition, the Viet Minh had organized provincial militia units of semi-trained men and also controlled elements of armed "partisans."

The fact that the Viet Minh carried on their resistance against the French without appreciable outside aid during the years 1947, 1948 and 1949, demonstrated to the peoples of Asia that the Viet Minh movement was truly an indigenous anticolonial movement for the independence of Vietnam. As such, it was deemed to


deserve the support of independence-minded people everywhere. Prime Minister Nehru of India, for example, has held throughout to this view. The fact that Ho Chi Minh has a long history of communist activity is often ignored, or attributed to his quest for a means to obtain independence for his country.

It was noted that during the War, the French had an army of about 50,000 men in Indochina, largely native Vietnamese. Additional forces were brought by increments from France after the Japanese surrender until, by mid-1949, the French Ex-

peditionary Corps totalled 90,000. In addition, the French forces included another 65,000 Indochinese. Also, about 25,000 armed militia (partisans) assisted on the French side. Of the FEC perhaps 50,000 were of French blood, the remainder were Foreign Legion with its predominance of Germans, Moroccans, Senegalese and other units of France's colonial forces. Unlike our forces in Korea, no draftees were included then or since. That is because the French Constitution carries a provision that drafted men shall not be sent into combat outside of Metropolitan France.

In order to reduce the number of small convoys to remote outposts and to reduce the number of soldiers employed on the relatively unproductive duty of convoy guards, the French early took up the practice of using transport planes to supply the more distant outposts. By 1949, more than one hundred such outposts were supplied by air transport, mostly in the form of air drops. The aircraft most used for these supply missions were a motley group of Junkers trimotored JU-52s derived from Germany at the end of the war in Europe. These aircraft had the advantage of being capable of utilizing airfields too small for the C-47s. About thirty JU-52s plus another 20 C-47s constituted the transport fleet until 1950.

As noted above, the Air Force was also called on to assist in guarding convoys, as well as to perform the more orthodox missions of reconnaissance, ground support and



Transport planes supplied the outposts



Airdrops of men reinforced the garrisons

bombing of Viet Minh bases. The Air Force that France could supply for Indochina, as of 1949, had a total personnel strength of perhaps 5,000 men. In addition to the transport aircraft, it operated about 30 Spitfire and Cobra fighters and a number of light observation aircraft. Though small in number of personnel, and sadly deficient in aircraft, that Air Force rendered yeoman service during those years of guerrilla warfare.

In these years the naval forces numbered about 500 officers and 8,000 men. One out-moded cruiser and about 20 sea-going patrol craft of subchaser or similar type constituted the "heavy" elements of the fleet. But it was on the rivers and canals of the two deltas that the navy performed its most important function. There it served to convoy barges or sampans loaded with supplies, or rice and other produce of the countryside on the traditional highways of the lowland areas of Asia. It also, of course, transported military supplies in its own LCUs. In keeping open these arteries of commerce, it was necessary to engage in frequent mine-sweeping operations to neutralize the primitive but annoying mines placed by the Viet Minh. The tortuous, sluggish waterways of the deltas with their overgrown banks lend themselves to ambushes, and such have been frequent from the beginning of hostilities. This, in turn, led the French to place as much armor and as many cal. 30 and cal. 50 machine guns on their convoy-guard craft as these LCMs and LCVPs could well carry.

Another function of the navy has been to conduct amphibious operations in support of the army. During this first period of the war, amphibious operations were confined almost exclusively to the delta areas. A typical operation conducted by a Division Navale d'Assaulte (DIN-ASAU) consisting of one LCI command ship, one LSSL or corresponding gunboat and a number of LCUs and LCMs sufficient to transport the troops and vehicles, for a clearing operation would be assembled and organized. The senior army officer, perhaps a battalion commander, would be in over-all command of the operation. Probably only a few light vehicles would be taken, but a number of "weasels" would be loaded.

Arrived at the locale chosen for the sweep, the landing craft would beach against the bank of the canal and disgorge troops and weasels. The force would then fan out and sweep through the prescribed area. Often the Viet Minh would have fled at the approach of the French in such force, hence the troops would find only abandoned campsites, as evidence that the quarry had again eluded their clutches. However, such operations did serve to harass the Viet Minh in their turn. Naturally, in the swamps and rice paddies where such operations took place, the light and broad-tracked "weasel" was a valuable adjunct to the equipment of the force. It could transport men and light supplies to places accessible to no other vehicle and could also cross the intervening streams as they were encountered.


French tribulations during these years are analogous to our own tribulations at the turn of the century in putting down the Philippine Insurrection. In that campaign we were ourselves operating against guerrillas in a country where these

decisive victory. Instead, she held her reinforcements to a minimum that served only to stalemate the growing strength and military aptitude of the Viet Minh.

With the advance in China of the Communists to the border of Indochina in 1949, prospects for the Viet Minh altered materially for the better. Their situation was somewhat akin to that of our own anticolonial Army of the Revolutionary War on the eve of French participation in that war. After several years of warfare without outside assistance against a foreign colonial power, years during which our Army had undergone the almost overwhelming hardships of Valley Forge, we at last had an ally who would assist us with supplies, advisors and even men. So did the Viet Minh now make effective contact with an ally.

In this country, it was foreseen that this junction with the Chinese Communists would materially enhance the strength of the Viet Minh and thus pose a greater danger of communist conquest in SE Asia. It was obvious that military and tech-


Patrol craft kept the canals open



guerrillas enjoyed the sympathy and support of the populace. It took us nearly two years of extensive military effort plus, it is said, the disbursement of a goodly quantity of "silver bullets" to bring Aguinaldo to surrender. Weakened post-war France could not then, or since, bring to Indochina the relatively massive forces required to gain a

nical aid heretofore channeled to European countries must be extended to include selected countries of the Far East. Accordingly, an economic mission headed by Mr. A. Griffin was dispatched to Southeast Asia in February 1950 and provision was made in the budget for an initial increment of \$75 million of aid for the Far East as a whole. In July,

In the beginning, the French were content to use their limited road nets to pursue the Viet Minh to the foothills and break contact there



a military survey mission headed by our Marine MajGen Erskine and Mr. Melby of the State Department was sent out to make an extensive survey of the requirements for defense of the Philippines, Indochina, Thailand and Malaya. As a result of the findings of these missions, military aid began to flow to Indochina and Thailand before the end of 1950. In the case of Indochina, this aid was to grow from a trickle to a torrent in the course of the next three years! For the fiscal year 1954 the aid program was to reach more than one billion dollars, in military items and financial assistance to France. The amount involved may perhaps best be comprehended by noting that in 1932 the budgets for the US Army (and Air Force) and Navy combined totalled less than a billion dollars! The extent of US concern over the possibilities for expansion of Communism into Southeast Asia is thus apparent. The defense of Indochina has also been deemed to be a defense of Thailand and Malaya. And the Communist infection already manifesting itself in Indonesia might well be encouraged to spread more rapidly by a Communist victory in Indochina. Hence these major expenditures by the US to blunt the Communist advance in a part of the world that was as remote as the moon to most Americans prior to 1950!

Naturally, it required several months for the consequences of the aforementioned junction of the Chinese Communists and the Viet Minh to manifest themselves in a military way. However, it was soon known that the Viet Minh were availing themselves of the sanctuary offered by now-Communist Kwangsi for training and equipping new units and avoiding the malaria, French bombing planes and lesser annoyances of the rainy season in the mountains of Tonkin.

In recognition of the probable increase in effectiveness of the Viet Minh forces, and following General Erskine's survey of the situation, the French decided to abandon their thin string of posts along the Tonkin border from Langson to Laokay. These posts now faced a potentially hostile China. In their rear, they looked on territory that was already in the hands of the enemy. It was recognized that the situation of these



But the Viet Minh capabilities increased

posts had now become untenable. The order went out to abandon them. It was during the course of the ensuing withdrawal from Cao Bang that the French forces encountered what was to stand as their major disaster of the war up till the loss of Dien Bien Phu. The Cao Bang garrison, 3,500 strong, was ambushed in a defile and virtually annihilated. In the course of the next few weeks some 700 men of this force succeeded in reaching French bases. The other survivors, if any, fell prisoners of the Viet Minh. Thus it was brought home to the French military in a shocking defeat that the Viet Minh capabilities had increased during the rainy season of 1950 even more than had been anticipated. Fortunately for French morale, it was shortly after this debacle of September 1950 that American military aid began to arrive, carrying with it the promise of more to follow.

A few weeks later, Gen De Lattre de Tassigny was appointed Commander-in-Chief of French Forces in Indochina and concurrently Commissioner General. As in the case of Adm D'Argenlieu, he thus combined in one person the highest civil and military posts in Indochina. There was considerable fanfare in connection with his appointment to the effect that he was to receive reinforcements and thereafter employ

a new and winning strategy. He received some nine battalions of reinforcements and set about establishing a Vietnamese National Army. While this Army was to be organized and trained under French supervision and was to serve under French command in combat, it was to owe its primary allegiance to the Government of Vietnam. In the meantime, and pending the organization of an effective indigenous National Army, Gen de Lattre continued to abandon a number of the more distant outposts and draw in their garrisons for the battles he foresaw in the Tonkin Delta.

The appeal held by the Viet Minh for the hearts and minds of the Annamites has made it difficult throughout for the French to organize and train a competent and reliable Vietnamese National Army. It has been difficult for the Vietnam Government to induct recruits for training. Once trained, the French could seldom be sure that the Vietnamese

units would not defect to the enemy at the first opportunity. Hence, they were compelled to assign the National Army units to rear areas where they would not be exposed to the temptation or opportunity to defect. Thus the hope of Gen de Tassigny that he would be able to raise and train a National Army that would take its place alongside the French in battle against the Viet Minh was not to be realized.

The campaign season of the winter of 1951 was marked by two major attacks on French posts in the Tonkin Delta. In each case the Viet Minh were reported to have committed some 30,000 men to the attack. And from each attack, they withdrew after two or three days of battle. Apparently the Viet Minh, in their turn, had over-estimated the extent of increase in their own military capabilities, hence attempted the tactics of all-out assault on these occasions. From each attack, they withdrew with heavy losses. By April, the Viet Minh high command had concluded that its forces were not yet capable of successfully meeting the French in open major engagements. The word went out to abandon direct attacks and revert again to guerrilla warfare.

The Viet Minh thereafter employed guerrilla warfare consistently and effectively for the next two years. It was not till the attack on Nasan, a heavily garrisoned French outpost in the hills 120 miles west of Hanoi, in early December 1952 that the Viet Minh again ventured a major attack on a French post. Here also they withdrew from the battle after assaults on two successive nights in which they sustained heavy losses.

From this battle they might have been expected to withdraw to their base areas, when the season became late for campaigning. Instead, several Viet Minh battalions debouched into the Kingdom of Laos. This was the first time Viet Minh forces in



The navy improved its delta operations

strength had penetrated into Laos. It seemed a daring undertaking at the time, since the Viet Minh were now venturing into an alien and inhospitable land. They advanced almost unhindered through the sparsely settled mountains of northern Laos until they seemed within striking distance of Luang Prabang. However, in late May 1953 they turned back again and returned to their native Vietnam.

The chief effect of these penetrations into relatively uninhabited territory was to demonstrate the increasing capability of the Viet Minh to range, in formations of strength up to a division, far from their own territory. A few weeks later, two other Viet Minh battalions penetrated into Cambodia for the first time, with the same effect. These demonstrations of the increasing scope of the Viet Minh area of operations were not lost on the outside world. France, in particular, observed them with apprehension.

As a result of the efforts of France and the US, the strength of the forces on the French side rose to a total of 500,000 men by 1954. Of these, 187,000 were from overseas and 160,000 were Indochinese incorporated in French units. All of these units were well organized and heavily equipped. The remaining forces were Vietnamese National Army and local militia, both less heavily equipped than the French regulars.

Each increase in men and equipment on the French side was apparently matched by a corresponding increase on the Viet Minh side. By 1954, the Viet Minh total forces had grown to 300,000 men, including militia and partisans. Whereas in

1949 they had deployed in units of battalion strength, they now deployed in divisions. Formerly a few 90-mm mortars were the heaviest weapons in the Viet Minh arsenal. Now, they matched the French in 105-mm howitzers at Dien Bien Phu. And notably improved capabilities in mining rivers gave the French Navy cause for increased worry. A corresponding increase in the VM ability to employ demolitions on roads and bridges increased the problems of the French engineers.

During the years of American aid, the growth in numbers of personnel in the air force was not as marked as the growth in its equipment. Its Spitfires and Cobras were replaced by greater numbers of F-8Fs and B-26s were added to give a bombing capability unknown in 1949. The total of combat aircraft, mostly fighters, amounted to about 200 aircraft. At least equally important, the addition of a great number of C-47s and a group of C-119s gave the French the capability of dropping paratroopers by battalions and of supplying a 10,000-man garrison solely by air. To keep so many aircraft in flyable condition, it was found necessary in February 1954 for the US to provide nearly 400 technicians to assist in the maintenance of both B-26s and C-119s. It was even necessary for the French to hire civilian transport pilots to fly some of the C-119s.

The French Navy, personnel-wise, was increased about 50 per cent during 1950-54. Loan by the US of the light carrier *Bois Belleau* enabled the French to maintain one carrier continuously on station in Indochina thereafter. Other lesser vessels

and craft, mostly of amphibious types, enabled the Navy to continue and improve the delta operations noted before and also enabled it to engage in amphibious operations at several points along the coast of Annam.

The tabulation that follows sums up the growth in personnel on the two sides during the years of 1950-1952 when both were receiving foreign aid:

<i>FRENCH EXPEDITIONARY CORPS</i>		1949	1952
French Union (Except Indochina)	—	90,000	187,500
Indochinese (largely Vietnamese)	—	65,000	159,800
Indochina auxiliaries	—	25,000	88,000
<i>NATIONAL ARMY OF VIETNAM</i>			
Regulars	—		83,500
Conscripts and Reserves	—		51,700
<i>OTHER FRENCH UNION</i>			
Navy	—	8,500	11,900
Air Force	—	5,000	9,700

Of the above total for the French Union (except Indochina), for 1952: 8,150 officers, 30,730 noncommissioned officers, and 43,000 men were French nationals. The others were Foreign Legion (including a high proportion of Germans), Senegalese, Moroccan and other colonial troops. Of the 82,000 men of French blood, it will be noted that nearly half were officers or noncommissioned officers. This points up the fact that Frenchmen, while constituting only about 20 per cent of the total forces engaged on their side, provided the major portion of the leadership for all elements of the French Union Forces. In consequence, the attrition in officers has been particularly dismaying to the French Government. Officer losses, as of 1 November 1952 were listed as 1,432 killed or missing in action. Enlisted casualties were shown as 26,814 killed or missing in action for the French Union (less Indochina), and total KIA for the Indochinese (90 per cent Vietnamese) were put at 21,260 officers and enlisted.

Specific published costs of the war in millions of dollars are shown below:

	France	Vietnam	US
1946	65.7		
1947	120.		
1948	190.3		
1949	305.1		
1950	465.4		
1951	628.6		
1952	1300.	86.	850.
1953	1140.	143	1160.

Marine Corps Gazette • January, 1955

Assaults were made on the coast of Annam





Amphibious operations were stepped up

As part of their own plan for the campaign season of 1953-1954, the French withdrew their garrison from Lai Chau, capital of the Thai tribes of Northwest Tonkin and concentrated this garrison at the more defensible site of Dien Bien Phu, 180 miles west of Hanoi. Several battalions of reinforcements were also flown in. It was apparently hoped that the Viet Minh could again be drawn into expending their strength in an abortive attack on a strongly defended position, as they had at Nasan in the previous year. When a Viet Minh Division and other elements by-passed Dien Bien Phu in January and February to drive into Laos, it looked as though they were going to ignore the enticing bait of Dien Bien Phu. It later developed that they were making thorough preparations during these weeks for a studied attack on the fortress.

The attack came in mid-March with a strength that shook the defenders and startled the High Command. The fortress, with its 10,000 defenders made up of the crack elements of the Expeditionary Corps, was entirely dependent on air transport for supply and reinforcement. It was thought that the artillery brought in by the French, ranging in size to 155-mm howitzers, would be able to out-range and easily neutralize any weapons the Viet Minh could snake in over rough mountain trails. But when the battle was joined, it was soon discovered that the Viet Minh had supplied themselves with 105-mm howitzers equal in number

to those of the French. With these, they were soon able to render the airstrip useless. The VM had also brought up anti-aircraft weapons of 37mm caliber that forced aircraft dropping supplies to remain at such altitudes that their drops were inaccurate. Thus, from the outset, the VM were able to greatly curtail the flow of supplies to the beleaguered garrison and to prevent all evacuation of wounded. As the siege wore on, the accumulation of wounded personnel became a very serious handicap in itself to the effectiveness of the defense. Against Dien Bien Phu, the Viet Minh brought three infantry and one artillery-engineer divisions, totalling about 35,000 men. Employing mole-like tactics of advancing entrenchments in the night and occasional human-sea assaults, they slowly and methodically "strangled" the defenders. On 7 May, a final all-out assault over-ran the defenses and the Viet Minh had gained their first major victory of the more than seven years of the war. It was to prove the climactic battle of the war!

While Dien Bien Phu was not of great strategic significance as a fortress, the loss of so many of the best troops of the French Command materially weakened the capabilities of that Command. But the most important result of the battle was the psychological effect in Indochina and France. With the Geneva Conference already in session, the demand in France for peace at almost any price became even more deafening.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Throughout the period of warfare outlined before, a series of political developments took place in Indochina. These developments were conditioned by the French objective of devising a formula and system of government for the area of Indochina that would inspire the indigenous populace to embrace the cause of France in the struggle against the Viet Minh and yet retain French control in the area. In Vietnam, following a period of uncertainty amid conflicting proposals, it was decided that a government would be built around the person of the ex-Emperor Bao Dai. This was the same Bao Dai who had inherited the throne of Annam as a youth in 1925, had declared the independence of Vietnam in March 1945 and had ceremoniously abdicated in the following August. He had thereafter sojourned for a time at Hanoi and was now living in Hong Kong. After protracted negotiations, French representatives persuaded him to meet with the French High Commissioner M. Bollaert in June 1948 on board a French cruiser off the coast of Northern Tonkin. A preliminary agreement was signed that provided for the return of Bao Dai to power in a non-hereditary role as "Chief of State" of Vietnam. Nine months later an exchange of letters between President Auriol and Bao Dai set out more definitive arrangements that provided Vietnam would be an independent, self-governing State within the French Union. It was to consist of the Provinces of Tonkin, Annam and Cochin China. There were also provisions that gave the French certain controls over foreign affairs, finances, trade and military controls for the defense of the State. Bao Dai assumed office under the terms of these agreements on 14 June 1949. He appointed General Huyen van Zuan as his Deputy Prime Minister and formed a provisional government. In July, France and the Kingdom of Laos signed a treaty that gave to Laos rights similar to those accorded Vietnam. Another similar treaty was concluded with the Kingdom of Cambodia in the following November. Henceforth, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia became the Associated States of Indochina within the French Union.



But it was still necessary to drop in the outpost . . .

Despite numerous agreements and a multitude of official pronouncements emphasizing the independent status of Vietnam since 1949, the extent of that independence remained suspect in the eyes of the populace and also in the eyes of most of the independent nations of Asia. Bao Dai's successive Deputy Prime Ministers and Cabinets, until the recent emergence of Ngo Dinh Diem, were easily identifiable as pro-French by training, affiliations and interests. Hence, the Bao Dai regime was regarded throughout as a puppet regime on which the French pulled the strings. It therefore has not succeeded in inspiring any enthusiasm on the anti-Communist side. The great mass of Vietnamese remain indifferent to the Vietnam that we recognize and are inclined to regard Ho Chi Minh as the outstanding patriot of the land.

GENEVA CONFERENCE

At the Four Power Conference held in Berlin in January-February, 1954 it was agreed that a conference would be convened in Geneva on 26 April to negotiate a settlement for Korea and to discuss means for bringing to an end the hostilities in Indochina. It became apparent, shortly after that conference con-

vened, that Indochina was to be the major topic of discussion. With neither side budging from its position on Korea, discussion of the problem of Korea was dropped on 15 June. In the meantime, negotiations on terms for a cease-fire in Indochina continued at high and low levels, with intermittent progress, through the fall of Dien Bien Phu and through the subsequent fall of the Laniel Government in France. When M. Mendes-France accepted the office of Premier on 20 June, he publicly promised that he would arrange a cease-fire in Indochina on honorable terms within one month or he would resign. Perhaps the Communist side had been waiting for Mendes-France to step out onto the stage before engaging in serious negotiation. Thenceforth progress toward an agreement was more rapid. With a probable indirect assist from the Eisenhower-Churchill talks and a trip by Mr. Dulles to Paris in July, Mendes-France's deadline was just met on 20 July by the signing of cease-fire agreements covering Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

The agreement pertaining to Vietnam provided:

(a) A demarcation line drawn at approximately the 17th parallel

would separate the Viet Minh regroupment zone in the North from that of the French and Vietnamese Armies in the South. Regroupment would be accomplished by phases over a period of 300 days.

(b) No reinforcements of personnel or war material can be introduced by either side.

(c) Free elections will be held by July 1956 to determine the nature of the government that will thereafter govern a unified Vietnam.

(d) No additional foreign military bases may be established.

(e) The implementation of the agreements is to be supervised by an international control commission on which India (Chairman), Poland and Canada are invited to serve.

The agreements covering Laos contained most of the provisions applicable to Vietnam. However, the French may continue to maintain two military bases in Laos garrisoned by 3,500 men and maintain a mission of 1,500 men for the purpose of training the Laotian Army. In the Northeast corner of the State, two small regroupment zones have been set aside for the Viet Minh adherents among the Laotians. The intent of the Laos agreements was to effectively neutralize the country save for the excepted French bases and troops.

The agreements for Cambodia seek to neutralize that country also. However, the Cambodian Delegation at Geneva balked at signing an agreement that would prevent their entering a foreign alliance. In the end, they obtained exception to alliances made under the principles of the UN Charter. Cambodia can not grant any military bases to another country unless she is threatened by aggression. Otherwise the agreements on Cambodia are about the same as those for Vietnam.

All of the cease-fire agreements are to terminate when national elections are held in the respective States. Laos and Cambodia are scheduled to hold such elections in 1955. Vietnam is to hold a nation-wide election in July 1956 that is to result in the unification of the State.

These cease-fire agreements have been widely attacked in the American press as a "French surrender," a "Southeast Asian Munich," etc. American official statements merely said that they were terms we could "respect." When one considers that

from August 1945 to December 1946 the Viet Minh governed all of Vietnam north of the 16th parallel, the cease-fire agreement for that State is recognizable as a virtual return to the status quo of that period. The elections to be held in 1956 can be considered as carrying through on the referendum promised for Cochinchina in the March 1946 agreement!

The fact that the French have advanced the demarcation line from the 16th to the 17th parallel, to include the militarily important base city of Tourane, the historically important city of Hué and the logistically important road from Quang-tri to Savannakhet must be attributed to good bargaining at Geneva. Certainly this advance cannot be attributed to gains on the field of battle!

Whether the cease-fire agreements are actually implemented in full remains to be seen. That will depend on the extent of the good faith observed by both sides and on the efficacy of the International Control Commission. It would seem that the Viet Minh can afford to carry out its side of the bargain in good faith for it is quite possible that the elections to be held in 1956 will result in the unification of Vietnam under the Viet Minh banner.

In conclusion, it seems worthwhile to emphasize the following points and lessons, derived from the events related above.

a. The peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia had a long history of independence behind them when the French first came to their lands. The Vietnamese also had a long history of resistance to incursions from China. In comparison with those centuries of resistance, the relatively short span of time since the French first came in force in 1858 and the shorter span since they consolidated their control of Indochina with the incorporation of the Protectorate of Laos in 1893, have been far too short to overcome the tradition of independence inherent in the Annamites of Vietnam.

b. French military strength, coupled with the "face" derived from that strength was sufficient, prior to 1945, to rather easily suppress the native rebellions that broke out from time to time. However, the harsh measures employed in suppressing those rebellions further

alienated the Annamites. In addition, French rule was devoted primarily to furthering the interests of Frenchmen and did little to better the lot of the natives of the land. Thus, a hatred of the French and of their works grew in the breasts of the Annamites that only sought a suitable opportunity to explode into violent resistance to French rule.

c. The Japanese occupation, particularly their cavalier treatment of the French Army and officials when they took direct control in Indochina in March 1945 demonstrated to the populace that their former masters were by no means a super-race and could be made to yield to pressures applied by other orientals if that pressure were great enough. The fact that it was not French but British forces that came to receive the Japanese surrender in the South, and not French but Chinese troops that came to the North for the same purpose, did nothing to revive lost French prestige. Hence a major segment of the population concluded that resistance to the French could succeed, even as resistance to the Chinese had succeeded in centuries past.

d. The French underestimated the extent and strength of the movement for independence in Vietnam, hence committed themselves beyond their military capabilities almost from the beginning. When France's financial strength proved inadequate to even maintain a stalemate with


the increasing strength of the Viet Minh, the US stepped in with aid in the form of military equipment and later financial aid. But with the Viet Minh now receiving aid from Communist China, the stalemate continued, with the VM potential increasing more rapidly than the French.

e. France's inability to effectively absorb and utilize additional massive increments of military and financial aid was primarily due to a lack of manpower. Draftees could not be sent to Indochina and the "bottom of the barrel" had about been reached for reinforcements of regulars. The alternative of forming a Vietnamese National Army was not successful because the Vietnamese National Army could not be inspired to engage in more than token combat for the French-sponsored Bao Dai regime.

f. Having effectively reached the "end of her rope" for prosecution of war in Indochina, France had only two alternatives remaining in the winter of 1954. She could seek the help of other nations in carrying forward the war, or she could seek a cease-fire with the Communists. Our newspaper columnists tell us that she did seek intervention by the US with at least naval and air forces and that we had made a conditional promise to so intervene. In the end, France chose a cease-fire on honorable terms. How much anguish would have been spared had foresight been equal to hindsight!

US & MC





North Vietnam . . . the rebels continued to demonstrate strong activity against our network of communications

THE LAST MONTHS IN INDOCHINA

(see map on page 54)

ALL PHOTOS FROM SERVICE PRESSE

The following is a condensation of an actual French report from Saigon, translated for the GAZETTE by Cdr J. J. McDonald, USN of the Naval Academy faculty.

Period of May-June 1954

During the period under consid-

eration, rebel activity continued throughout the entire theater of operations. It was particularly sustained in the Tonkin Delta and was also indicated by renewed activity in the Mountain Plateaus. The activities, as they occurred, follow.

Tourane — posts attacked

Nam Dong — rebels slipped away

Trieu Phong — they took losses

North Vietnam

In the Tonkin Delta, the rebels continued to demonstrate strong activity against our network of communications from Hanoi to Haiphong, our river boats in the Middle Red River and our installations of the South and West Zones.

Laos

A grouping of four of our battalions proceeded with a large scale mopping up operation in the region from Muong Sai to Nam Bac. This operation, after some initial skirmishes, developed without enemy opposition. Therefore, after having placed covering protection at a distance from the capital, we pro-





Rue sans joie—dunes and rebels

ceeded with the reduction of our forces and materials.

After our re-establishment in this region, about a hundred Laotian infantrymen, missing since the beginning of May, and about one hundred escapees from Dien Bien Phu, 50 of them Europeans, succeeded in regaining our lines. Finally, the air lift with Dien Bien Phu was completed by the first of June with the evacuation of medical personnel.

In Middle Laos, the continuing lack of action permitted us to proceed with the building of installations in the Calcaires and the relief of Mobile Group 2, which will go first of all to Mahaxay via Route 12 assisted by a recovery group, then be air lifted from Seno to North Viet-

Tuy Hoa—attack repulsed



Quang Tri—softening up . . .

nam for further deployment.

In Lower Laos a mopping up operation was in progress.

Central Vietnam

The renewal of rebel activity, already noted during the preceding month, continued to increase and throughout the territory many posts are being attacked and harassed. Two of them have been taken by the enemy in the region of Dong Hoi as well as two others near Tourane. However, the latter two have been retaken as a result of softening up operations by our forces.

Moreover, it may be noted that some important mopping up operations were launched in the Quang Tri sector; the rebels managed to slip away from the first trap in the

Ankhe—garrison evacuated




. . . and also mopping up

basin of Nam Dong, but received some fairly heavy losses in the region of Trieu Phong and the Rue Sans Joie (Street without joy).

In the Binh Ding, where the Viet Minh problem was manifested only by harassing attacks, our forces continued reconnaissance and patrol, while the base at Quinhom was being relieved of part of its stockpile.

In the Phu Yen area, rebel pressure was felt and our forces carried out the withdrawal to Tuy Hoa of the troops stationed at Song Cau and Chi Thank, as well as the civilian population which gathered in that region. Following this withdrawal, which was accomplished without incident, an attack on our positions around Tuy Hoa was re-

Phu Yen—rebel pressure felt





Central Vietnam—several quick strikes were made by our Naval Commandos supported by air

pulsed, but not without a heavy loss.

In addition, an ambush against one of our convoys near Bobonneau Pass cost us several vehicles.

In the Plateaus, rebels attacked in force in the region of Cink Son. By regrouping our forces around M'drag, we are now able to engage the rebels who are retiring towards the northeast. At the same time, our mobile units in the vicinity of Pleiku and Cheo Reo are maintaining reconnaissance activities which give rise to only occasional skirmishes of little importance.

Finally, after considerable relocation by air lift of materiel and of

the civil population, the garrison at Ankhe was evacuated the 24th of June via Route 19 towards Pleiku. The same day the convoy was attacked near PK 13 and lost almost all of its material and about 20 per cent of its personnel. However, it succeeded in reorganizing by the 25th of June at PK 22 where a relief group coming from Mang Yang proceeded to join it.

In the South Coastal Zone, rebel activity was intense against our small outposts.

South Vietnam

The situation continued to get worse, especially in the province of Mytho. It was just as bad in the

sector of Saigon-Cholon where the ammunition depot of Phuto was sabotaged.

Another indication of the deterioration of the situation was the steadily rising number of desertions.

Naval Forces

Several quick strikes were made by our light ships and the Naval Commandos in Central Vietnam.


The activity of our river forces was particularly intense in the Tonkin Delta where they engaged in the supply and the withdrawal of certain stations. During one of these withdrawing operations, a rebel ambush caused us considerable losses.

US MC

Cholon—sabotage . . .

. . . and the situation . . .

. . . continued to get worse . . .





Do you have the incendiary urge . . .



. . . or the pack rat philosophy

CLASSIFIED!

By Capt E. S. Stallknecht

THE HANDLING OF CLASSIFIED material in the Marine Corps today has developed into an uncontrolled tug-of-war between the incendiary urge and the pack rat philosophy.

My observations have convinced me that the controlling factor in the handling of classified material is not the *Security Manual*. Instead, the handling is governed by fear and uncertainty—fear of reprisals and uncertainty of limitations.

There has been no coordinated effort to adopt new, modern, streamlined and efficient methods.

Ask yourself a question, "Am I willing to place into effect new practices for handling classified material?"

Changes are always hard to introduce and in the case of handling procedures for classified documents they are expected to be even more difficult to influence. It takes a sudden and unpleasant situation similar to an investigation into the mishandling and loss of a document within the unit to cause a revision of practices. More likely than not, the new practices will reflect a fur-

ther tendency toward additional prohibitions and confusion rather than simplification and better accountability.

A former detachment commander could probably visit his old command after an absence of several years and still find the field safe stuffed with classified papers that he left there because he didn't know whether it was safe to dispose of them or not.

Likewise, a custodian on his first year on the job is so alarmed by prohibitions that he is reluctant to

explore the possibilities for better handling. He has inherited, in many cases, an undesirable job. It is quite often poorly run and inadequately supervised. The current business practices are often a hold-over from horse-and-buggy days, yet they are never questioned. Inadequate service from the files is accepted and shrugged off as commonplace.

Even an energetic custodian with plans for better management can often create no interest in, or action on, a proposed revision of practices. In a great many cases we find the new custodian adopting an attitude of lethargy in handling the material and as a result he often settles down and files two slogans in his mind: "I'll do my time on this job and skin out," and "The less I do, the less I do wrong."

To illustrate, let's watch as the new custodian assumes his duties:

The custodian is given a letter. It tells him that he is now the custodian of classified files and that he should be guided in the performance of his duties by the *Security Manual*. The person who signs this letter honestly believes that this is all that Lt Neophyte needs to develop into a Grantland Rice of the "classified" world. The adjutant, when he hands the custodian the letter, puts on his best light, airy smile (clouded slightly by memories of past custodians), squeezes his arm reassuringly (the closest he has come to expressing sympathy for some time) and sends him over to meet the old custodian.

Here the welcome is warm and genuine. There is a whirlwind tour of the files in which all of the good points are explained and a few gems of wisdom are confided. These go something like this: "This job is a snap. Just don't go out looking for trouble and nobody will even know you're around. Don't lose anything and nobody will ever tell you how to do your job. They're all afraid to poke their noses in here for fear they'll have to share in the responsibility if something goes wrong. Everything I ever received is still here. Don't worry about that pile of junk in the corner, that's just extra copies. Here's the inventory, let's rush through it. I wish I'd have had longer to know you but I gotta' pick up my orders and catch a

plane. If you have any questions you can write to me in Japan. Here's the *Security Manual*, just look it over and you won't have any trouble."

The new custodian is now a thoroughly bewildered Marine officer. He has walked into a new world with new terms. To any other task that he has ever been assigned he has brought new, fresh ideas. If he has brought any to this new job he is reluctant to place them into effect.

Fear and uncertainty have already delivered a telling blow.

Whether he is assuming custody of a field safe with a few papers or a vault full of documents, he still needs local amplifying instructions. This is particularly necessary in two areas almost completely ignored in the *Security Manual*—methods of accountability and a program of destruction.

At this point you will probably ask, "What can we do about it?"

There are many things that can



be done to improve handling procedures without reference to higher authority. These handling procedures should fit into a logical, easily flowing pattern which is easy to learn. Each step should satisfy a definite need. Once the best step has been discovered all other steps to satisfy the same requirement should be discarded.

If we think of classified documents as items of property we find that accountability is not much different. Certainly, we can agree that simplification of handling procedures will

foster better control. Our basic principle of custody and accountability is easily defined. It is: Have accurate and rapid accountability procedures while a document is in local custody.

We should be able to: identify it easily; locate it quickly; tell how many were received or produced; maintain easily found, easily accomplished, accurate receipts and dispose of the material when it ceases to have record or information value or retire it when it ceases to have ready reference value.

Any procedure that does not aid in accomplishing these things must be eliminated. Any practice that is unnecessarily cumbersome must be revised. Any duplication of effort should be avoided.

With this in mind let us examine, in detail, some of the customs and procedures which might well be considered poor or outdated, and the steps that can be taken to correct and modernize our handling procedures.

Log Books

Does your classified file section maintain a log book? If you have a small unit receiving only three or four documents a week it may serve your purposes satisfactorily. A larger organization will find, however, that this cumbersome and sentimental carry-over from the days of high stools and green eye shades can be replaced more readily than any other outdated custom still being practiced.

The log book should be replaced by a card system. Furthermore, the cards in their original form should be multiple copy with carbon inserts. This will provide flexibility of identification procedures and finding aids. The question of cost will immediately arise. A survey will show that compared to the cost of making entries in log books and the duplication required to provide some other method of control, the cost of cards is negligible.

Identification procedures

Without some standard method of identification the classified documents are extremely hard to locate, particularly for purposes of accountability. Most activities now have some standard form of serialization of outgoing classified correspond-

ence. The ease with which such a document can be located by reference to the serial should be ample evidence to support such practices.

Using the same method, a simple serial placed on each incoming document in order of receipt will provide the control needed. This should not be an elaborate combination of dates and times but a simple numbered sequence which may be quickly placed on all copies by a mechanical device. Either a numbering machine, or an adjustable stamp similar in design to a date stamp are useful for that purpose.

From this point on, the document assumes a new, easy to recognize and easy to handle identity which will act as a control device on all documents, finding aids, receipts, routing slips and certificates of destruction.

documents, it is still possible that this document could be filed in three separate places for three different quarters.

The number of cards needed will vary with the size of the organization. Headquarters Marine Corps uses a six-copy form. The classified files section of Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic uses similar cards. These feed into a typewriter directly from the shipping box and as the cards are typed they may be torn off and the carbon discarded.

When separated, there are six handy finding aids which may be arranged in sequence by numerical designator, originator and subject breakdown.

Receipts for documents handled locally

Many commands are in the habit of using local custody receipts which

ceipt when the document is turned in.

It provides a handy and efficient locator while the document is out on routing — this eliminates the necessity for some unwieldy separate system such as duplicate buck tags. By referring to the date it was last signed out, the card can be used as a ready reference in calling in overdue documents. The same receipt can be used repeatedly for the same document and can be thrown away when the document is returned for file.

Receipts for documents mailed to other commands

These receipts can, in many cases, be streamlined to reduce labor. Many commands list the basic correspondence, the endorsements and the enclosures. This is usually unnecessary. A driver who draws a car from the motor pool for the day is not required to sign for a car and then sign for the battery, tires, generator, spark plugs and gasoline separately. All of these are considered to be a part of the car and he merely draws car number 55555.

Usually, therefore, only the serial number of the document and the number of copies enclosed is necessary.

Mailing practices

The mailing procedures should provide for rapid handling, accurate records of mailing and ease in completing these records upon return of the receipt from the receiving agency. The outgoing mail record, if one is kept, should be brief. It can be in list form and need include only the following information:

Serial, Addressee, Postal Reg. No. and Date Receipt Returned

The system should provide for the postal registry number to be entered on the receipt at the time it is enclosed in the inner envelope. This will save time in three places — mailing, receipting and matching the returned receipts against mailing records.

Records of accountability

When a document has been permanently removed from the files it is necessary to have some central and easily accessible place to record this information. The original find-

RECEIVED ABOVE	DATE	SECTION	ABOVE RETURNED
1st Lt. John O. Frosty	AUG 5, 1953	G-2	SEP
Capt. J. M. Hardneselen	Sept 11, 1953	G-3	SEP
Prof. James B. Johnson	SEPT 15, 1953	G-2	SEP

DOCUMENT RECEIPT NAVMC HQ 239-ADM D18332

... a controlling device that's easy to handle

Finding Aids

Many classified files sections have very poor finding aids. A finding aid may be considered poor if it does not provide accurate and immediate aid in finding the document in question.

In spite of instructions contained in the filing manual it is usual and understandable that several documents on a like subject will be filed in different places. Take for example a document on "Quarterly Report of Radar used in Guided Missiles." Even if the same person chooses the file designator for all

are in list form. As documents are turned in they are crossed off of the receipt and as others are drawn they are added on. Obviously, this is a sloppy and unsatisfactory procedure.

Any alteration of the original receipt immediately renders it useless as proof of custody. *There should be an individual receipt for each document.* Only the assigned serial number need be listed for identity. A receipt of the type shown above may be used.

Such a receipt has several advantages: It can be filed numerically — this saves time in locating the re-

ing aid card filed in numerical sequence has great versatility as a place to record such data. It will provide a historical record of downgrading, transmittal to another command, or destruction. It may even be used as the actual certificate of destruction for secret and top secret documents by using a stamped entry similar to the following on the reverse of the card:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPY
NO(S) _____
HAVE BEEN DESTROYED BY BURN-
ING THIS DATE, WITNESSED BY:

(NAME) _____ (RANK) _____

(NAME) _____ (RANK) _____

Records of destruction

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
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As opposed to the hard-to-interpret description of record material, we find that the description of non-record material is set forth in detail and leaves no room for guesswork as to what type of document falls within this category. Article 11551.2 of the *Marine Corps Manual* states, "Material not within the definition of 'records' includes: (a) extra copies of printed or processed materials of which official copies have been retained for purposes of record, (b) 'tickler,' 'follow-up' or 'suspense' copies of correspondence, (c) 'reading file' copies of correspondence, (d) 'superseded publications,' publications of other Government agencies, catalogs, trade journals, and similar publications. *Such matter should be destroyed when it ceases to have local administrative value.*" (Italics mine.) Marine Corps General Order #158 fills a large gap by setting forth, in detail, a similar description and authority for destruction of this non-record material, both classified and unclassified.

Among this non-record material, and of primary importance because of its bulk, is the accumulation of extra copies. Each organization should have a time established, at the expiration of which all extra copies are destroyed unless instructions to the contrary are received from interested internal agencies.

To assist interested agencies and to act as an alert signal, a stamped reminder in the following form may be placed on the buck tag (routing slip) of the routed copy:

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DISTRIBUTION OF EXTRA COPIES.
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copies will be destroyed after 30 days.

Such a procedure reduces the bulk of extraneous matter in the file section, gives the custodian con-

fidence and assurance when he finds it necessary to destroy extra copies and simplifies accountability.

We now have procedures to control the extra copy accumulation but we have not gone far enough. We are still confronted with the jumbo prize package of all problems within the classified files.

By far the greatest accumulation of documents in the permanent files of a unit occurs among the technical and informational documents received from another activity. These documents often have widespread distribution and take the form of multiple addressed letters, booklets, draft manuscripts or formal bound documents. Often a small activity is deluged with copies of material that it does not need, or a large activity must request to be placed on a mailing list for an entire series of publications in order to obtain a limited few which pertain to its activities or interests.

In the larger commands an estimated 50 per cent of such material has no informational value to the recipient, and it is easily assumed that another 40 per cent outlives its usefulness within a year or two after publication.

The remaining 10 per cent may be valuable reference material for projects under study in a receiving activity and be needed to retain the continuity of a project when the files are retired.

In number of documents, it is estimated that this type of material will account for approximately 40 to 45 per cent of the files. In bulk, however, we find that approximately 75 per cent of the available file space is used to store this unnecessary accumulation, since the type of document within this category is usually bulky.

To leave this material in the files is similar to filling a home freezer with corn on the cob. It's mostly cob.

Were you ever appointed to a board to screen out non-record material prior to retirement of files? If so, you can picture the problem of obtaining sufficient persons to intelligently screen all documents on all subjects.

Each department must be afforded an opportunity to decide on the ultimate disposition of any docu-

ment within its field of interest if the task is to be performed properly. Therefore, each representative must screen a major portion of the files to review his material. The result is similar to a farmer who finds it necessary to have his field plowed seven or eight times before it is fit for planting. It's like raking leaves in a windstorm.

Obviously, this is the negative approach to the problem. It results in documents being missed, valuable papers being destroyed through ignorance of their value as records, confusion in the files, added problems of accountability and sloppy, haphazard procedures in general.

For these reasons it is my conviction that a decision as to the ultimate disposition of this non-record material should be made when the document is received.

Here is how it should work:

All classified documents should be received at a central location, receipted for and distributed or routed from this point. The officer who places the routing on the buck tag should watch carefully for the type of document that appears to be non-record material. He should examine these documents to determine that there are no instructions by the originator requiring return of the document or prohibiting destruction. He should then place a stamp in the following form on the buck tag prior to routing:

AGENCY HAVING PRIMARY INTEREST	
CHECK ONE	
<input type="checkbox"/>	RETAIN PERMANENTLY IN FILE (Record Material)
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<input type="checkbox"/>	DESTROY AFTER ROUTING (No Record or Info value)
Unit _____	Signature _____

The immediate results of such a program should be quite satisfying with approximately 90 per cent of this type of material being tagged for destruction within 24 months. Fifty per cent of this amount would probably be cleared for the next trip to the incinerator and never reach the files.

Benefits of such a program of destruction would be far reaching. Let's examine a few of the advantages of these two steps.

We have reduced the space needed for filing in direct proportion to the use made of the stamps. We have

accomplished an immediate screening of documents by a department which is primarily interested in the subject matter.

We have avoided a belated, haphazard, time consuming and expensive screening and have tagged these documents so that they can be removed by clerical personnel of the files unit instead of by a board of officers. We have obtained added control of the remaining documents. Above all, by setting forth in writing a criteria for the disposition of such non-record material we have dispelled the fear, the uncertainty and the superstitions that have always existed in the minds of personnel relative to destruction of a classified document.

In this article I have attempted to stimulate an appreciation of the need for education in two important areas that have been ignored in the *Security Manual*—methods of accountability and a program of destruction. This education should not be limited to the custodian or the supervisor. It should be aimed at every person who handles a classified document.

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US & MC

ing aid card filed in numerical sequence has great versatility as a place to record such data. It will provide a historical record of downgrading, transmittal to another command, or destruction. It may even be used as the actual certificate of destruction for secret and top secret documents by using a stamped entry similar to the following on the reverse of the card:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPY NO(S) _____ HAVE BEEN DESTROYED BY BURNING THIS DATE, WITNESSED BY:	
(NAME) _____	(RANK) _____
(NAME) _____	(RANK) _____

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
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US MC

passing in review

BOOKS OF
INTEREST TO
OUR READERS

Unromantic War . . .

GREEN BERET, RED STAR—Anthony Crockett, 220 pages. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode Ltd. \$2.60

At the time we go to press, and to the best of our knowledge, the GAZETTE is the first American publication to run a review of this book.

With the recent loss of Hanoi and North Indochina to the Communists, the attention of the Western World has been directed to the Far East—in particular to South China, Thailand and Burma. Where does the future lie? What can be done to halt the slow erosion of the Free World?

The hopes of many lie in the great new alliance of SEATO.

Anthony Crockett—a regular British Marine officer of wide experience and 20 years service—has produced his book at a very opportune moment.

For the last five years the British have been waging a slow, unromantic and expensive war against the communists in Malaya—a country whose natural resources of rubber and tin are of great importance to the West. Sometimes the war has seemed almost won, but always the danger lurked and never was it really purged from the system.

With the Communist success in Indochina the surrounding countries may well see a resurgence of troubles, not only in Malaya itself, but in the whole Burma-Thailand area.

Green Beret, Red Star tells the story of the life of a troop commander in a Royal Marine Commando unit, from the day he set foot in Singapore to join his unit as a reinforcement Major, to the departure of the unit for the Middle East.

It tells the story—rarely heard—of the fighting man's view of the war. The constant patrolling, the discomfort of jungle operations and the tremendous effort for little re-

sults. It tells the story of the Iban trackers and life on patrol, the great reliance on air supply and the indomitable spirit of the tin miners, planters and local police.

Many outside observers of the communist war in Malaya have not



fully understood the considerable organization of the enemy both within and outside the jungle—all this is explained and made simple in this interesting and delightfully written book.

Anthony Crockett has a happy turn of phrase and an impish sense of humor. It is very clear that he has the greatest respect and confidence in the men of many creeds and races who fought with the commando units—the Tamils, Chinese, Indians and Malaysians. The solution to so many problems lies in understanding and working together in confidence. Perhaps it may be the solution in Malaya.

Reviewed by LtCol P. W. C. Hellings, RM
Ed: LtCol Hellings is presently the RM liaison officer at MCS and a close personal friend of the author, both having served in 3 Commando Brigade during the Malayan Emergency.

Southeast Asia Background . . .

MALAYA, INDONESIA, BORNEO, AND THE PHILIPPINES. Charles Robequain. New York, 1954: Longmans, Green. \$6.00

MALAYA: COMMUNIST OR FREE? Victor Purcell. Stanford, California, 1954: Stanford University Press, Under auspices of Institute of Pacific Relations. 288 pages. \$3.00

THE COMMUNIST MENACE IN MALAYA. Harry Miller. New York, 1954: Frederick A. Praeger. 248 pages. \$3.50

Westerners know little enough of the Orient. Southeast Asia is perhaps known the least of all.

Three books recently published should contribute to the dispelling of this ignorance. Professor Robequain, displaying typical French scholarship, describes the islands of Southeast Asia and the Malayan peninsula. Dr Purcell and Mr Miller narrow the focus to Malaya and the struggle against Communism there.

Robequain's work would receive a high mark as an intelligence area study. It is translated by E. D. Laborde from *Le Monde Malais*, one of the few works which covers as a whole this part of the world.

Purcell and Miller parallel each other up to a point. Both have lived most of their lives in Malaya; Purcell as a government official, Miller as a newspaperman. Both cover chronologically the historical background of Malaya, the events leading up to the current troubles, World War II, resistance against the Japanese, post-war Communist revolt and British countermeasures. Here similarity ends. Dr Purcell, from the scholar's point of view, presents a critical account of the struggle. He is bitterly critical of the British policy of divide and rule as exemplified in the discrimination against Chinese in favor of Malays.

Also critically scrutinized are the repressive measures used to stamp out the Communist revolt. Dr Purcell also feels that free elections and self-government for Malaya must be realized; otherwise it will go the way of China and Indochina.

Miller, on the other hand, presents the popular readable, newspaperman's account of Malaya's problems. It is, by his own admission, not a political book. He represents a straight forward point of view which doubtless is also the official line. The Communist revolt and British antiguerrilla warfare, as well as the politics of both sides, are dealt with in straight reportorial fashion. The Communist atrocities and murders, the antiguerrilla patrols, the resettlement of Chinese squatters, the politics, the personalities; all are dramatically but honestly presented.

Interestingly, Purcell and Miller reach similar conclusions about the solution to Malaya's problems. Both feel that the non-Communist peaceful Chinese must be taken into partnership and self-government established. Miller, writing in 1954, reports much progress along this line. Purcell, writing from 1952 observations predates these developments.

Reviewed by LtCol Brooke Nihart

New Light . . .

REALITIES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY—by George F. Kennan. Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N. J. \$2.75

In *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*—embodying his two famous articles on Soviet-American relations—George Kennan became the foremost spokesman for what is called the containment policy. Flowing from this policy were measures which blocked the complete sweep of Soviet control over Europe and Asia in the years following World War II; our insistence upon remaining in Japan and in Germany and Austria, support for Iran in the Azerbaijan crisis, assistance to Greece and Turkey, the Berlin airlift, stiffening Europe with Marshall plan aid and the defense of the political integrity of the Republic of Korea.

Eventually, as it is to be expected,

critics of this policy were to emerge. Most articulate among them perhaps was James Burnham who blasted containment as a defensive and defeatist policy in *Containment and Liberation*.

In subsequent months, many statements and editorials bore the imprint of Burnham's ideas, but as time passed they began to lose their luster. Even Burnham had trouble translating his general concepts into practical measures. For example, his "bold" program for positive action to strike the opponent when off balance following the death of Stalin consisted of such limited actions as freeing the anti-Communist prisoners in Korea, making clear the welcome we would give a freed Albania, forming exiled military units, helping Chiang Kai-shek advance his schedule, charging Moscow with genocide and aggression, making the captive peoples know that Stalin's death can be the preface to freedom, and telling the Soviet subjects that we are with them and against their tyrants.

The military aspect of the liberation policy, as expounded by Burnham, was the now familiar idea that we must stop thinking in terms of defending an endless number of scattered areas all over the globe and concentrate on deterrent offensive power capable of being applied directly against Stalin's Heartland.

In the light of subsequent events this idea, too, looks a little less lustrous. As a matter of fact, for nearly ten years we have had the air/atomic power to attack Stalin's Heartland. During this time we have observed the continued loss of peoples and territories to the Communist orbit. The Communists, not wanting an atomic war, have simply pursued their objectives by other means—means in relation to which the capacity for massive retaliation is largely irrelevant.

One wonders too if massive air/atomic power is really the handmaiden of a bold policy. Take Indochina for example—does our undeniable capability for massive retaliation encourage a bold policy to liberate North Vietnam? The Chairman of the JCS, who is well qualified to evaluate the effects of military policy upon diplomacy, said re-

cently, "I believe that this nation could be a prisoner of its own military posture if it had no capability other than to deliver a massive atomic attack." In this statement he recognizes that if our military posture embraced only an air/atomic capability it would inhibit rather than embolden our policy. Admiral Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, went even further, saying that the very existence of the air/atomic capability "imposes upon statesmen restraints of a kind novel in history."

Fortunately, according to Mr Kennan's latest reflections, contemplation of the situation need not drive us to drink; or to the suicidal frenzy of preventive war. While we must maintain a position of strength, including the capacity for massive retaliation the latter, in all probability, will never be used. The unhealthy overextension of Soviet power will not be remedied by sudden drastic and direct means.

To those who are accustomed to saying that the day of limited conflict is over, Mr Kennan suggests that the truth is exactly the opposite; the day of total war is past and limited military operations are the only ones that could conceivably serve any coherent purpose.

The greatest danger to us of Soviet policy, he says, is its ability to promote internecine division and conflict within our system of alliances and within our own body politic. But he feels that this is something we have it in our power to counteract by the quality of our leadership and the tone of our national life generally. If these were what they should be, they would radiate themselves to the world at large and that radiation would represent the best means of frustrating the design for further Soviet expansion. It would also be the best means of helping the peoples behind the Iron Curtain to recover their freedom.

The publication of the *Realities of American Foreign Policy* throws a strong new light on the liberation-versus-containment controversy and shifts the burden of proceeding to Mr Burnham and those of his persuasion.

Reviewed by Col J. C. Murray

Books on Parade

- 1 **MacArthur 1941-1951**
MajGen Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain
Here is the man and the complete account of his achievements during the most momentous decade of his life and ours. \$5.75
- 2 **The Unseen and the Silent**
George Iranek-Osmecki
Adventures from the underground movement narrated by paratroopers of the Polish Home Army. \$4.50
- 3 **The Bridge Over the River Kwai**
Pierre Boulle
A triangle of defeat and victory. The Japanese on one side, the partisans on the other and Col Nicholson who built the bridge, directly in the middle. \$3.00
- 4 **The Edge of the Sword**
Capt Anthony Farrar-Hockley
This is the story of the stand of the 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment at the Eastern Crossing of the Imjin River in Korea—an epic of British military history. \$2.75
- 5 **The American Sword 1775-1945**
Harold L. Peterson
A survey of the swords worn by the uniformed forces of the United States from the Revolution to the close of World War II. \$10.00
- 6 **Irregulars, Partisans, Guerrillas**
Irwin R. Blacker
Great stories of irregulars in action—from Roger's Rangers to the Haganah. \$5.00
- 7 **Confederate Agent**
James D. Horan
The true story of the conspiracy that came close to destroying the Union from within. \$5.00
- 8 **Russia by the Back Door**
Leon Maks
This book answers one of the most important questions in the world today. "What are the Russians really like?" \$3.50

Note: Orders for books need not be limited to those listed above. Subscribers may order any book in print by furnishing the title, author's name and the publisher. Regular discount will apply. Such orders will be filled as forwarded without delay.

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- 10 THE KOREANS AND THEIR CULTURE *Osgood* \$5.00
- 11 CAVALRY OF THE SKY *Montross* \$3.00
- 12 MILITARY JUSTICE HANDBOOK *Dept of the Army* \$0.75
- 13 THE GUN DIGEST *Amber* \$2.00
- 14 SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE *Garthoff* \$7.50
- 15 THE FINAL SECRET OF PEARL HARBOR *Theobald* \$3.50
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SQUADS RIGHT

The Rifle Company

FORMATIONS—THE FORMATIONS of the company are: line, column of platoons, close column of platoons, line of platoons and column of squads. (See Nov. GAZETTE.) Of these formations the first two are assembly, ceremonial and drill formations. In close order drill, marching in line is exceptional; column of platoons is habitually employed for drilling troops in marching in line; close line is suitable for street parades.

The company assembles in formation in line or close column of platoons as directed. At the formation of the company in line, platoons are numbered consecutively from right to left. These designations do not change.

For convenience in giving com-


leader. The next two senior NCOs are assigned as guides.

A company of fewer than six squads is commanded by the company commander as a single platoon but it retains the designation of the company.

CLOSE ORDER DRILL—Platoon leaders repeat such preparatory commands as are to be immediately executed by their platoons, such as *forward* and *squads right* and the men execute the movement at the command of execution, such as **MARCH** and **HALT** (if applying to their platoons) when given by the company commander. Platoon leaders do not repeat the company commander's commands in executing the manual of arms or in those commands which are not essential to the execution of

DRESSING—At the command *Guide Center* (right or left), platoon leaders command: *Guide right* (or left) according to the position of their platoons. *Guide Center* designates the right guide of the center platoon, or the left guide of the right platoon if there are only two platoons.

When platoons are to be dressed, platoon leaders place themselves on that flank toward which the dress is to be made 2 paces from the guide in prolongation of the line and facing the point of rest. It should be noted that in executing any movement or facing, in aligning units or in moving from one post to another, officers and NCOs maintain a military bearing and precision of movement.



Company in line

mands and for reference, the designations *right*, *center* and *left*, when in line and *leading*, *center* and *rear*, when in column, are applied to the platoons. These designations apply to the actual *right*, *center*, *left*, *leading* or *rear* platoon in whatever direction the company may be facing. The senior NCO in each platoon is designated as assistant platoon

a troop movement by their platoons. Thus, at the company commander's command: *column of squads*, *leading platoon squads right*, the platoon leader repeats only the command *squads right*. In giving commands or cautions, platoon leaders may prefix the numbers of their platoons as: *First platoon*, **HALT**; or *Second platoon*, *squads right*.

If the company is in line the guide dresses promptly on his platoon leader and the platoon beyond, thus establishing the line. During the dress he moves, if necessary, to the right and left only. The platoon leader dresses the platoon on the line thus established.

When the formation requires the simultaneous execution by platoons

of movements such as *Right Front Into Line* or *On Right Into Line*, etc, the company commander may cause such movement to be executed by prefixing when necessary, *platoons* to the command prescribed; such as, 1. *Platoons, right front into line*, 2. *MARCH*. To complete such simultaneous movements the commands "halt" or "march," if prescribed, are given by the company commander. The command "front" is given by the platoon leader.

In successive movements into line, each platoon leader, where applicable, halts when opposite or at the point where the right (left) of his platoon is to rest and gives the necessary commands from this post for changing from column to line, so that the right (left) of his platoon will rest at the proper point.

In successive movements into line, each platoon leader, where applicable, marches beside the guide to the point of rest, after his platoon forms line or begins the change of direction.


Whenever commands are given involving movements of platoons in which one platoon stands fast or continues the march, the platoon leader commands *STAND FAST*, or cautions *CONTINUE THE MARCH*, as the case may be.

☛ **TO FORM THE COMPANY** — The senior NCO takes position 6 paces in front of the point where the center of the company is to be, faces it and commands: *FALL IN*.

When the company is to be formed in line, the center guide places himself facing to the front so that the center of the company will be opposite and 6 paces from the senior NCO. The other guides place themselves at prescribed intervals from the center guide. When the company is to be formed in close column of platoons the right guide of the leading platoon places himself so that the center of his platoon will be opposite to and 6 paces from the senior NCO, and the right guides of the rear platoons place themselves so as to cover the right guide of the leading platoon at prescribed distances. Each platoon sergeant takes post 3 paces in front of the point where the center of his platoon will be. The platoons form in their proper places, under the

supervision of the platoon sergeants and guides.

The platoon sergeants then command: *REPORT*. Remaining in position at order arms, the squad leaders, in succession from the right in each platoon report, "All present" or "— absent." The platoon sergeants then command: 1. *Inspection*, 2. *ARMS*, 3. *Order*, 4. *ARMS*, face about and, at the command *REPORT*, given by the senior NCO, the platoon sergeants, beginning with the



first platoon make their report successively.

All platoons having reported, the senior NCO then commands, *Posts*. At which time the platoon leaders come from behind their platoons around the right flank, as the platoon sergeants move to their posts around the left flank of the platoon. The platoon sergeants take their posts. The senior NCO then faces about, makes his report and, without command, takes his post.

If the platoons cannot be formed by squads, the platoon sergeants command: 1. *Inspection*, 2. *ARMS*, 3. *Right shoulder*, 4. *ARMS*, and call the roll. Each man, as his name is called, answers "Here" and executes "Order arms" if armed with the rifle. The platoon sergeant then effects the division into squads and reports the platoon.

The company commander places himself 12 paces in front of, and facing, the company or the leading platoon, in time to receive the report of the senior NCO. The platoon leaders take their posts when the NCO has reported.

The company not under arms is formed in a like manner omitting reference to arms.

In forming the company, all who are required to make a report salute and maintain it until the report is acknowledged.

TO DISMISS THE COMPANY — The company being in line or close column at a halt, the company commander directs the senior NCO, "Dismiss the company." The officers fall out, the NCO moves to a point 6 paces in front of the center of the company or the leading platoon, salutes, faces toward the company and commands: 1. *Inspection*, 2. *ARMS*, 3. *Port*, 4. *ARMS*, 5. *DISMISSED*.

Dismissal may also take place by the company commander commanding: "Dismiss your platoons." Each platoon is then dismissed as described for the company, the platoon sergeants performing the duties as prescribed for the senior NCO.

☛ **TO GIVE THE COMPANY A NEW ALIGNMENT** — 1. *Guides center (right or left) platoon on the line*, 2. *Guides on the line*, 3. *Center (right or left)*, 4. *DRESS*, 5. *Guides*, 6. *POSTS*.

At the first command, the designated guides come to the trail, place themselves on the new line, face toward the center (right or left) and come to "Order arms." The company commander establishes them in the direction he wishes to give the company.

At the command "Guides on the line," the guides of the other platoons take posts in like manner facing the center (right or left) so as to prolong the line.

At the command "Dress," each platoon leader dresses his platoon to the flank towards which his guides face. The right (left) front-rank man places his breast against the left (right) arm of the right (left) guide. The guides remain at "Order arms."

At the command "Posts," given when all of the platoons have completed the dress, the guides take their posts.



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THE MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION

✻ The purpose of this writing is not to ruminate upon the history of the Marine Corps Association alone. It is intended as a reminder to those who have forgotten, or who have never given thought to, the reasons and ideals behind the Marine Corps *Gazette*.

It was back in April 1913 when a small group of officers from the 2d Provisional Marine Brigade based at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba formed the Association. Under the leadership of [then] Col John Archer Lejeune, they banded together for the purpose of "recording and publishing the history of the Marine Corps; publishing a periodical journal for the dissemination of information concerning the aims, purposes and deeds of the Corps and the interchange of ideas for the betterment and improvement of its officers and men."

Through the exchange of ideas, the knowledge, experience and creative thought of each officer could be made available to every other officer of the Marine Corps.

This concept was developed further and as a result, more than 40 years later, the Marine Corps *Gazette* is the well-established organ of an Association which has grown from its former minute membership of 60 Marine officers to an organization of more than 50,000 members—a fraternity that includes officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps and other military services.

In extolling the value of the contributions made by the Marine Corps Association we must not overlook the fact that through the pages of the *Gazette* an open forum for the discussion of new concepts of warfare on land, sea and in the air has been maintained. Here, for four decades, the thoughts of Marines have been aired, their experiences presented for comparison with the vision of others and the lessons learned in the hard practicalities of war have been presented.

Through these years the pages of the *Gazette* have carried the story of the rifle, the tank, the airplane,

the equipment of the individual, the colossus of logistics and the furor of the atom bomb. Every phase of warfare has been revealed in its varying facets because the Marine Corps Association provides the means for presenting those subjects for their value to its members.

In reflecting on the Marine Corps *Gazette* and its beginnings, one cannot help but be impressed with the astuteness of its early planners and of the Association which saw the need for "some means of bringing the officers of the Corps together, as well as for an organized system of education." To be a member of such an organization, open to *all* Marines, is to be part and parcel of that hard fibre which binds us together and helps us to maintain the standards of the past and guarantees the future strength of the Corps.

As a member of that Association you are enjoined to contribute any material that you feel will benefit the professional approach and stimulate thought among our company.

A LOYAL BAND DEDICATED TO THE PRESERVATION OF THE CORPS

